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ESSAYS ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN INDIA
Hae Nim Lee
Santosh Anagol
This dissertation studies local governments and the effects of their vertical and horizontal
structures on public goods provision in India. The first chapter focuses on political repre-
sentation and the vertical structure of decentralized governments. Political decentralization
combined with minority representation has been purported to give power to the poor. Yet,
it is unclear what form of minority representation can best achieve this. In this paper, I
ask whether group (mis)alignment across local and intermediate level representations affect
public goods distribution to the poor in the context of the Indian National Rural Em-
ployment Generation Scheme (NREGS), one of the world’s largest social welfare program.
Exploiting changes in caste representation driven by India’s reservation system intended
to increase minority caste representation, I show that minority representation at the local
level alone does not increase the transfer of public goods to minority castes. Instead, I find
more transfers when there is minority representation at both local and intermediate levels
of government. Finally, I show policy-relevant heterogeneity effects coming from electoral
motivations of intermediate level representatives and tastes for own caste under a decentral-
ized government. The second chapter examines the horizontal aspect of local governance
using India’s vastly different rural and urban local government structures. There have been
increasing voices that rural local governments lack capacity to govern areas with burgeon-
ing population. I test if this is true and whether local governance affects access to public
services, such as treated tap water and closed drainage, in general. To do this, I compare
public goods provision between rural and urban local governments after controlling for ob-
servables, level of urbanization, and fixed effects. Importantly, I create an objective measure
of the extent of urbanization with daylight satellite data and population data. I find that
v
despite the inclusion of these controls and fixed effects, there are positive and statistically
significant effects of having an urban local government. I also provide results for placebo
tests that show government structure does not directly impact access to private services.
Finally, I explore financial decentralization of local governments as a channel.
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CHAPTER 1 : Intergovernmental Group (Mis)alignment: Implications For
Redistribution
1.1. Introduction
Too often, services fail poor people in access, in quantity, in quality. But the
fact that there are strong examples where services do work means governments
and citizens can do better. How? By putting poor people at the center of
service provision: by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers,
by amplifying their voice in policymaking, and by strengthening the incentives
for providers to serve the poor. World Bank Development Report (Devarajan
and Reinikka (2004))
Unequal access of resources for underprivileged minorities has been an ever-important po-
litical issue. A common solution used by policymakers is political representation, and this
tool is thought to be more feasible with political decentralization. According to the Inter-
national Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), there are 130 countries
with constitutional, electoral or political party quotas as of 2020. For example, in Peru, 15
percent of candidates in 11 out of 25 regions are required to be members of native com-
munities (Htun (2004)). However, whether more representation of the underprivileged can
help level the playing field remains a debated question both theoretically and empirically,
especially when cooperation across multiple levels of government is required.
In this paper, I investigate the effects of political representation at multiple levels of gov-
ernment on distribution of public services to the underprivileged. This is a departure from
existing literature and policy discussions, which primarily focus on a single level of rep-
resentation. Decentralization is considered to be suitable for ethnically or socially diverse
developing countries where preferences are heterogeneous and information is more easily
shared at the local level (Gadenne and Singhal (2014)). Moreover, governmental programs
1
seldom get executed directly from a single level of government.1 Yet little is known about
the effects of representation across multiple levels of government on distributive politics.
Some key roadblocks are the lack of random variation in group representation at multiple
levels of government and lack of group-level data that can explicitly show distribution to
poor minorities. I overcome these challenges in the context of India’s federal system.
First, I leverage India’s political reservation system that mandates representation of lower
castes as a source of exogenous variation in group representation. The caste system is a
hierarchical social structure that perpetuates deprivation of those in lower castes. More-
over, as an ethnically and socially diverse country, India promotes decentralization as a way
to improve public services delivery (Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006)), leading to multiple
levels of government. While the castes of representatives are not random, the reservation
system that operates separately at each level of the government creates variation in caste
alignment. At times, the castes of representatives are "aligned" (e.g. when multiple levels
of representatives are lower caste) or "misaligned" (e.g. when local representative is lower
caste and intermediate is upper caste).
Secondly, I use detailed data from India’s National Rural Employment Generation Scheme
(NREGS), which produces detailed data of the subsidized jobs allocated with caste infor-
mation. NREGS is one of the largest welfare schemes in the world and, like many other
schemes in India, it is administered at the local level to better target socioeconomically
vulnerable households. The total number of jobs or local capacity is determined by the
intermediate government and the allocation to households by the local government. Hence,
the final allocation of NREGS jobs depends on the interaction of these two levels of gov-
ernment.
1For example, in the United States, public schools are funded through states and school districts, where
considerable discretion from states and school districts determine the final allocation of funding to each
school.
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With local level panel data by caste, I measure the difference in changes in NREGS jobs
allocated over time between constituencies that become reserved for lower caste and those
that do not. I then compare these difference-in-differences for local constituencies that have
a lower caste reserved intermediate representative to local constituencies without intermedi-
ate lower caste reservation, thereby measuring triple-differences. In other words, I compare
the effects of lower caste representation when there is misalignment across levels to the
effects when there is lower caste alignment. I define lower caste as Scheduled Caste (SC) in
this paper due to their history of discrimination and minority status.
Using monthly sum of days generated within a local constituency, I find that SC represen-
tation at the local level with caste misalignment does not affect transfer of subsidized jobs
to SC households. On the other hand, with both SC local and intermediate representa-
tion, SC households experience an increase of NREGS work in a given month compared to
when only the local level is SC. This increase accounts for approximately 17 percent of the
monthly SC work-days. Results show that with a non-SC intermediate representative, the
overall capacity of NREGS distribution decreases for areas with SC local representatives,
suggesting the importance of political hierarchy.
To understand these results, I explore three sources of heterogeneity: electoral motivation,
taste for own caste, and better information within caste. Electoral motivation can affect
distribution if politicians use public programs to increase their chances for re-election. Fol-
lowing literature that finds heightened effects of electoral motivation with more political
competition, I use difference in vote share between the winner and runner-up from previous
election to measure political competition. Evidence suggests that intermediate representa-
tives distribute more jobs to caste-aligned local areas when there is greater competition,
consistent with Dixit and Londregan (1998) and Arulampalam et al. (2009). Becker (1971)
3
suggests that taste for own-group can affect allocation patterns. With greater weight put
on utility of own-group members, a utility maximizing representative may allocate more to
own-group members. I find that an event that increases the salience of castes can increase
distribution to own-caste, suggesting that taste may be another channel as in Hjort (2014)
and Shayo and Zussman (2011). Finally, I explore the channel of better information within
own-group. If the channel is less information friction in own-group, we can expect better
targeting for own-group households. I use jobs going to poorer households as a measure
of better targeting and do not find evidence of better targeting despite better information
being one of the arguments for decentralization.
This paper extends the literature on the effects of representation and diversity on transfers
to the poor in a few ways. First, I shed light on conflicting results surrounding the effects
of representation on policy. Theoretically, Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) suggest that
the identity or preferences of a representative should not affect policy. Following the spatial
competition and median voter theorems, a score of empirical papers have found that repre-
sentation does not necessarily lead to promotion in an elected official’s status (Ferreira and
Gyourko (2014); Jensenius (2015)). On the other hand, "citizen-candidate" models devel-
oped by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) predict that politicians
will implement their preferred policies. Hence, minority representation should lead to poli-
cies preferred by the minorities. Accordingly, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and Beach
et al. (2019) find empirical results supporting this view.
Even within papers studying India’s political quota, results are inconsistent across settings,
levels of government studied, and goods or services provided. For instance, Pande (2003)
shows that state-level political representation of minority castes improves transfers of bene-
fits to them. Also, Saad et al. (2020) find that areas with high minority caste population that
are politically protected give greater access to NREGS jobs to the minority caste. In con-
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trast, Dunning and Nilekani (2013) and Jensenius (2015) find no evidence of improvement
in access to transfers for targeted minority castes from reservation. These conflicting results
demonstrate the need to find sources of heterogeneity, and this paper speaks to that issue. 2
My work also relates to the literature on how political misalignment across tiers of gov-
ernment affects transfers. Typically, these studies show that the upper-level government
provides more transfers to lower-level governments for re-election purposes (Dixit and Lon-
dregan (1998); Arulampalam et al. (2009); Gupta and Mukhopadhyay (2016); Bracco et al.
(2012); Asher and Novosad (2017); Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008)). I am not aware,
however, of studies that can trace the final allocation to households by group as in this paper.
Finally, this paper speaks to a body of work examining how diversity affects public goods
and services allocation. While these papers show a negative relationship between diver-
sity and public goods provision, (Easterly and Levine (1997); Alesina and Spolaore (1997);
La Ferrara (2003); Miguel (2004)), to my knowledge, they do not consider heterogeneity
coming from multiple tiers of government. I find that diversity does affect public goods
distribution negatively, but that with intergovernmental alignment, favorable allocation to
underprivileged minorities is possible.
I also make a contribution to NREGS data by collecting one of the largest and detailed
monthly panel datasets. There have been many studies looking using NREGS data (Aiyar
and Samji (2009); Corbridge and Srivastava (2013); Niehaus et al. (2018)). However, most
micro datasets are cross sectional and datasets spanning multiple years are at a coarser geo-
graphical level. By scraping data directly from the NREGS website, I am able to construct
2Sharan and Kumar (2019) does directly discuss the effects of "mismatch" in intergovernmental
representation. However, the lower level representatives discussed in the study have negligible roles in
actual allocation of public services. In fact, lower level representatives here are closer to proxies for the
area’s group (in this case, caste) composition. Hence, the results are more akin to presence of in-group bias.
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a balanced panel dataset spanning eight years for 7,584 unique local constituencies.
Although the setting of this paper is India, decentralization with socioeconomic diversity
is not isolated to this setting. Instead decentralization has been a global trend for lower-
income countries in the past three to four decades (Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006)) and
many high income countries like the United States are heavily decentralized. Decentral-
ization allows minority representation to be more feasible, but the question is if creating a
seat for minorities is enough. I find that rather, political hierarchy and representation at
more than one level of government determine the extent to which minority representatives
can assist the underprivileged. Hence, if policy makers in decentralized countries want to
enhance the status of poor minority groups, it is crucial to consider representation at more
than one level of government.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2, I provide institutional
background on the caste system, India’s governmental organization, and specific roles rele-
vant representatives play in NREGS job allocation. In addition, I will give a more detailed
account of the history and characteristics of NREGS. In section 1.3, I introduce a concep-
tual framework that can help us understand why political hierarchy and group can affect
redistribution. Section 1.4 discusses the data used. I lay out my empirical strategy of triple-
difference in section 1.5. Section 2.4.1 shows results and section 1.7 discusses heterogeneity




The caste system is a form of social stratification that has endured for more than 3,000
years3 It categorizes Hindus into four groups – Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and the
Shudras, listed in order of hierarchy. The minority group I focus on in this paper, Scheduled
Castes (SC), was below and outside of the caste system entirely; members of this caste were
historically called "untouchables." The caste system was closely tied to occupation, and SC
mainly worked as sewer and toilet cleaners. There was also residential segregation where
lower and upper castes did not even share a well. According to the 2001 Indian census
the SC population accounts for 16.2 percent of the total population with about 166 million
identifying is SC.
Years of historical discrimination has left lower castes behind socioeconomically. In order
to give lower castes opportunities, India instituted mandatory quota or reservation systems
for lower castes across schools, jobs, and politics. Importantly, for this paper, political seats
across multiple tiers of India’s decentralized government are reserved for the lower castes.
While caste-based discrimination is no longer legal, the remnants of its effect remain as
people continue to identify themselves with their castes. Voting along caste-lines is com-
mon and there were 48,935 cases of hate crimes targeting scheduled castes in year 2018 and
only about five percent of all marriages were inter-caste. 4 Economically, about 84 percent
of highest earners in SC rural households makes less than 5,000 rupees a month (about 60
USD) while approximately 70 percent of non-lower caste households belong to this category
according to the Caste Census in 2011. Moreover, as of 2011, 66 percent of SC were literate
compared to the population average, 73 percent.
3There, however, has been scholarship showing that the caste system was institutionalized in the mid to late
19th century with British colonization of India.
4National Crime Records Bureau in India
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1.2.2. NREGS
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) is an In-
dian labor law and social security measure passed in 2005 and aims to improve livelihood
security in rural areas. The Act created Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), the scheme under which rural jobs are distributed. NREGSs
"guarantees" at most 100 days of rural work in a financial year to every rural household. It
is the largest public works program in the world, providing employment to some 50 million
rural households and affecting the lives of up to 250 million individuals. 5 Moreover, the
Indian government is planning to spend Rs 660 billion or US$8.9 billion on NREGS for the
2020-2021 financial year.6
NREGS expanded to all of India starting in 2008. The jobs provided are unskilled in nature
and try to aim for creation of public goods or assets. Some examples can be removal of
weed and construction of government assisted housing. On average, households that work
NREGS jobs can earn around 40 percent of their monthly income through the program.
The administration of the scheme occurs at the gram panchayat level, the smallest rural
political unit in India. The costs of the scheme is shared between the Center and the
state and the budget is decided at the state level at the beginning of each financial year.
Yet, to reach state approval the budget has to go through the approval of each tier of the
rural government first (there are three tiers). For a household to get a job through the
scheme, they must obtain a job card at the local gram panchayat’s office. Workers then can
apply for work and local officials allocate the jobs. If jobs are not available, unemployment
benefits are to be given, but this rarely happens. While NREGS is meant to "guarantee"
every rural household employment, in reality, the program is supply driven. As a result,
allocation heavily depends on program officers that are responsible for overall monitoring




and implementation of the scheme and the sarpanches, who are responsible of the job
allocation at the gram panchayat level.
1.2.3. Local government structure
With the passage of the seventy-third and seventy-fourth constitutional amendments in
1994, India granted local governments with constitutional status and required regular local
elections. The goal was to devolve enough power and resources to local governments so
they can function as self-governments. Importantly, much weight has been put on the local
governments’ responsibility to provide public services, implement poverty alleviation pro-
grams, and promote distributive equity (Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006)). I consider two
key political positions that have heavy influence over allocation of NREGS jobs: members
of legislative assembly (MLA) and sarpanches. The MLAs are part of the state legislative
assembly (Vidhan Sabha) and sarpanches are head of gram panchayats, where gram pan-
chayats are India’s smallest self-governing unit. The hierarchy of the government structure
is represented in Figure 1.1. The two levels in focus are denoted with red boxes around
them. Key here is that the MLAs are hierarchically above sarpanches. Figure A.1.1 shows
assembly and gram panchayat boundaries in the state of Rajasthan in India. Rajasthan is
one of the larger states in India with strong emphasis on agriculture. The figure shows the
relative geographic size of assemblies compared to gram panchayats.
MLAs are directly elected to the state parliament every five years. There may be concerns
about partisan bias in MLA reservation boundaries and status, but they are decided by In-
dia’s Delimitation Commission in accordance to the census. The current borders are based
off of the 2001 Indian census. There are overall 4,121 legislative assembly seats in India
and each state must have at least 60 and no more than 500 members in each state with
some exceptions. The number of assembly seats each state are designated depends on the
state’s population. As a legislator, the MLA plays an important role in enacting or opposing
new laws for the state. MLAs also have financial power in the state assembly and provide
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consent to the budget and expenses made from the state treasury. 7 For MLAs, NREGS is
an important political tool that is used as "election winning devices" according to Maiorano
(2014). Furthermore, MLA elections are usually competitive, encouraging MLAs to work
for votes. MLAs affect NREGS jobs distributions in two main ways. First, MLAs influence
the appointment of field/block officers (hired on a contract basis), who implement NREGS
alongside with the sarpanch. Studies also find that MLAs may manipulate the selection of
works (Aiyar and Samji (2009)), lobby for certain projects that are more visible, or target
politically valuable communities Maiorano (2014). Beyond the influence through block of-
ficers, MLAs also affect the NREGS budget. The shelf of works for NREGS jobs and labor
budget have to be approved by the block panchayat and the state government before every
financial year, and MLAs have power in both levels.
The sarpanch represents her gram panchayat and is the point of contact between interme-
diate level government officers and the village community. A gram panchayat consists of a
group of villages, and each gram panchayat consists of on average about 420 households.
The sarpanch is typically elected every five years either by the village council (Gram Sabha)
or directly by the villagers. The sarpanches also depend on partisan politicians, such as
MLAs for funds for pork projects (Schneider (2014)). There, however, are large differences
in how active a sarpanch is depending on the state. In terms of NREGS implementation, the
sarpanch is theoretically the final allocator of NREGS jobs. A worker who wants NREGS
jobs must physically apply at the council office. Plans and decisions regarding the nature
and choice of works are made in open assemblies of the Gram Sabha and ratified by the
sarpanch with the oversight of the block officer, a local bureaucrat. Even though allocation
decisions are supposed to be joint decisions of the council, in practice sarpanches make the
decisions either themselves or jointly with their spouse (Jeong et al. (2019)). Figure 1.2





1.2.4. Gram Panchayat Reservation
Across most gram panchayats in India, sarpanch is subject to caste reservation. When a
seat is reserved for a particular caste, only candidates in that particular caste are eligible
to run for election 8. By reserving positions of power for underrepresented castes, this
system aims to give more voice and power to the minority castes as it is rare for a minor-
ity caste to win seats in absence of reservation due to the voting pattern following caste lines.
While the exact reservation rules differ by state, states commonly rotate gram panchayats
to be reserved, meaning not all gram panchayats are reserved and the selection of gram
panchayats that are reserved change each local election. Gram panchayat reservation de-
cisions are made at the the block level, which are composed of several gram panchayats9.
The number of gram panchyats to be reserved per block is proportional to the block-level
fraction of the caste to be reserved. For example, when determining the number of gram
panchayats to reserve for schedule castes, if 40% of the block population is scheduled caste,
40% of the gram panchayats should be reserved. The population is to be taken from the
most recent existing round of census data. Gram panchayats are listed in descending order
of their fraction or population of scheduled caste and from this ordered list, gram panchyats
are reserved in order from the top each election. Each local election prompts rotation of
reservation. For instance, if the first five gram panchayats from the list were reserved this
term, in the next local election, the next five gram panchayats are reserved. While these
are the official rules, implementation itself can vary across districts. Moreover, the lack of
publicly available official gram panchayat-level population data makes it difficult to assess
the exact compliance.
8There are exceptions like gram panchayats in scheduled areas.
9In my sample of 10 districts in Uttar Pradesh and 5 districts in Rajasthans there are on average around 44
gram panchayats within a block
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I illustrate this process through a mock example of scheduled caste reservation rotation
in Table 1.1. Here, we will assume that this block consists of 40% scheduled caste – this
means that 40% of the gram panchayats should be reserved. In this example, there are
ten gram panchayats, so four gram panchayats should be reserved. Column "pop SC" has
scheduled caste population and the "theory reserved 2010", "2015" show whether a gram
panchayat should be theoretically reserved ("Y") or not ("N") in election years 2010 and
2015 respectively. Note that the gram panchayats have been listed in descending order of
SC population. In 2010, we see that the first four are theoretically reserved. In 2015, the
next four gram panchayats are reserved, and this pattern continues on, with 2020 having the
last two (I, J) and first two gram panchayats (A, B) reserved. This rotation rule naturally
ensures that a gram panchayat does not get reserved for consecutive terms10.
1.2.5. Assembly Reservation
Since 1950, seats in the Indian Parliament and state assemblies were reserved proportional
to their share of the minority caste population. In each Indian state and about 20 percent
of assemblies are reserved. Unlike gram panchayat reservations that rotate, the reserved
assembly constituencies remain stable over year other than infrequent changes in boundaries
by the delimitation commission according to population changes. The last update occurred
in 2008.
Crucially for my paper, caste reservations for the sarpanch and MLA occur independently.
Consequently, there are times that reservation of the gram panchayat and asembly are "in
sync" where both positions are reserved for SC and other times where SC reservation is only
at one or none of the levels. Changes of alignment in castes of sarpanch and MLA vary over
time and geography will be used for my empirical strategy of triple-difference and will be
discussed further in section 1.5.
10India’s Supreme Court capped reservations at 50 percent.
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1.3. Conceptual Framework
In this section, I explain the intuition behind why caste misalignment can matter for re-
distribution, in particular of NREGS jobs, to minority castes. Figure 1.3 schematically
shows how NREGS jobs can be allocated in a decentralized government like India’s. (S)
refers to SC and (N) non-SC. The numbers represent jobs to be distributed. "Intermediate"
refers to MLAs in this case, and "Local" refers to sarpanches. The last row demonstrates
final allocation to households by caste. For purposes of this example, we will assume that
representatives at both levels distribute more jobs to own-caste at a 4-to-1 ratio. While
this paper does not directly uncover the cause for this pattern. I will discuss sources het-
erogeneity that suggests possible factors that affect the distribution. The left hand side of
the tree represents allocation process for an SC MLA, who has 100 jobs to allocate. Within
the constituency of this SC MLA, there are gram panchayats with SC sarpanch and non-SC
sarpanch. MLAs cannot directly target households but can target gram panchayats using
sarpanch’s caste. Since we assumed that more jobs go to own-caste, 80 jobs go to gram
panchayats with SC sarpanch and 20 to the rest. Now, within a gram panchayat, there are
SC households and non-SC households. Focusing on the SC sarpanch, 64 out of 80 jobs go
to SC households following the previous assumption. On the right hand side of the tree
MLA is non-SC as illustrated. This time, out of 100 jobs, 80 jobs go to non-SC sarpanch
while 20 go to the SC sarpanch. Again, looking at the gram panchayat with SC sarpanch,
16 out of 20 households go to SC households and 4 to non-SC. Although in both cases there
is local minority (SC) representation, depending on the caste of the intermediate repre-
sentative, or the MLA, final allocations to SC households can be very different. With SC
representation at both levels (on the left hand side), SC households receive 64 jobs whereas
with SC representation at only the gram panchayat level, SC households receives 16 jobs.
This simple example shows that minority representation at one tier of government alone
does not necessarily lead to greater public service access to minority households. Rather,
with the combination of decentralization and greater distribution to own-group, minority
representation at one level without group alignment with other tiers can negate efforts to
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redistribute to minorities. While not the focus of this paper, we also see that for the non-SC
households the same story applies. That is, with non-SC alignment comes greater allotment
to non-SC households.
Why might we expect more distribution to own-group? I discuss channels of taste, electoral
motivation, and information. These channels, in the context of a multi-level administration
system can give insight into why group misalignment can affect redistribution. It is impor-
tant to understand why distribution can be affected by each of these factors as governments
can evaluate appropriate policy changes to increase transfers to minorities if that is their
goal.
First I will examine the channel of taste. Following Becker (1971) more transfers to own-
group can occur due to taste for own-group members. Politicians can put higher weights
on utilities of own-group members relative to others who are not. Assuming utility is in-
creasing in transfers, a utility maximizing politician then would direct more transfers to
own-group. Empirical papers applying this theory have found results consistent with the
theory in lab experiments (Charness and Rabin (2002); Chen and Li (2009)) and team
production in private sector (Hjort (2014)). In this paper’s setting, if representatives prefer
own-caste, there would be larger transfers from MLAs to own-caste sarpanches and larger
transfers from sarpanches to own-caste households as predicted by the example in figure 1.3.
Electoral motivation can be another factor affecting allocation, meaning politicians may use
NREGS as a political tool. According to Dixit and Londregan (1998) and Arulampalam
et al. (2009), incumbent politicians may be interested in their own re-election. Also, they
may be interested in promoting own-group politicians as their stronger presence can lead
to better performance for incumbents as well. Politicians would prefer to direct resources
to clearly identifiable groups to maximize chances of election. Exerting the same effort,
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politicians can more effectively "swing" voters by targeting groups with larger marginal
utility from redistribution. In this case, the marginal group is the SC households. More-
over, MLAs understand that misaligned sarpanches will allocate jobs in a way that is more
beneficial to the sarpanches’ own group. Following this mechanism, with higher electoral
competition we can expect stronger effects of targeting (Arulampalam et al. (2009); Cascio
and Washington (2014); Gupta and Mukhopadhyay (2016)). This follows figure 1.3’s pat-
tern of larger transfers from intermediate representative to SC local representatives with
alignment. In this paper’s setting, the minority caste local representatives, or sarpanches,
have little electoral motivation as (1) it is difficult to be elected without caste reservation
and (2) the same gram panchayat is unlikely to be reserved for the very next term. Hence,
I will abstract away from electoral motivation coming from sarpanches and focus primarily
on the electoral motivation of the MLAs.
Better information flow within own-group can also explain more transfers to own-group. If
local representatives are more aware of the needs of own-group households and the inter-
mediate representatives more aware of their own-group local representatives, there can be
relatively more accurate beliefs regarding the transfer needs of own group (Bohren et al.
(2019)).With the channel of better information, or less information friction, we can then
expect better targeting within own-group. I will empirically go over these three channels in
section 1.7.
1.4. Data
This paper merges key three datasets: (1) NREGS panel data at the month, gram pan-
chayat, and caste level (2) gram panchayat reservation panel data at the gram panchayat
and election year level, and (3) assembly level cross sectional reservation data at the as-
sembly level. I will explain these three datasets first, then describe the population census,
caste census, and geographic boundaries data. The final sample is a balanced panel dataset
that includes 11 districts from Uttar Pradesh and 5 districts from Rajasthan for years 2012
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to 2019. The sample includes 103 unique assemblies and 6126 unique gram panchayats.
My sample is limited to these districts and years due to data availability and the districts
were selected at random11. Both are large northern states in India with heavy reliance on
agriculture and active political decentralization. Uttar Pradesh is the largest state in India
by population with the largest number of poor in India. Rajasthan is the seventh most
populous state and while it made great strides in reducing poverty, around 15 percent of
its population is still below poverty line. With large demand for NREGS jobs, both states
also actively implement NREGS, making it ideal places to study.
1.4.1. NREGS
The NREGS dataset I have compiled contains total days of work generated through NREGS
and the monthly number of households that worked at the gram panchayat level. The vari-
ables come from the NREGS official website where each individual’s job card is uploaded.12
The job card is at the household level and lists the household members that are registered
to work, work applications, offered works, and actual work completed alongside with the
number of days applied and worked, and amount of money the household is owed and paid.
In addition to work information, the job card includes information on household’s caste and
whether the household is below the poverty line. Below poverty line (BPL) households are
government designated and apply to households that earn less than a set level of income.
The BPL level is set nationally for rural and urban areas separately. Job cards also denote
state, district, block, and gram panchayat information, which have to be matched by name
with other datasets. By collecting data directly from individual job cards, I am able to have
detailed data spanning multiple years. While many scholars have collected NREGS data
over years, my data’s level of detail, frequency, and panel nature make it unique. Specifi-
cally, high frequency panel data with caste information are rare in India.
11The sample districts are districts that I have finished scraping and cleaning the data first. The order of
which district I started was selected at random.
12https://nrega.nic.in/Netnrega/stHome.aspx
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There is controversy over how accurate NREGS data are as people fear "ghost workers,"
where false jobs and workers are recorded, or incomplete data entry. If there is more collu-
sion when there is intergovernmental alignment and thus, more ghost workers, there can be
an upward bias in the effect of group alignment estimation. Through heterogeneity analy-
ses, I show that my results are not driven by this channel.
In fact, the most glaring issue with the data is that it does not measure demand accurately.
Officials generally only record instances where work was actually given. Hence, while it
looks like most applicants are granted work, we in fact do not know how many actually
applied. Furthermore, anecdotally, households don’t "apply" for jobs as they do not know
when jobs will be available. Instead they are often offered jobs by the sarpanch when there
is availability. Hence, I do not attempt to measure demand directly from the NREGS data.
1.4.2. Reservation
The gram panchayat reservation data contains reservation status at the gram panchayat
level for each local election cycle. While there are differences across states, the data typi-
cally includes name of sarpanches, their caste, and reservation status. In my sample, there
was a local election in 2010 and 2015 for Uttar Pradesh and 2011 and 2016 for Rajasthan.
There is no centralized source of local elections information. Rather some states publish
their election data on the state election commission website. MLA election data on the
other hand is publicly accessible from India’s election commission and includes information
on candidates running, their castes, party, votes they received, and reservation status.
I intersect assembly geographic boundaries data with 2001 village-level boundaries data that
I aggregate up to the gram panchayat level. The assembly boundaries come from Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 India and the 2001 village boundaries come from New
York University Spatial Data Repository.
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1.4.3. Census Data
Demographic data is sourced from India’s census conducted in 2001. Census variables
include population by caste, size (area), literate population, number of primary schools,
and so on. The census is conducted every ten years. India’s census data is provided at the
village level, which is a building block of gram panchayats. As the unit of analyses is at the
gram panchayat level, I aggregate the data to gram panchayat level, which is a nontrivial
process as much of it relies on matching by name.
1.4.4. Caste Census
Finally, I collected income data by caste from the Socio Economic and Caste Census 2011.
While this data does not provide exact income, it breaks down the income of households’
highest earner to one of three income brackets by caste. The three categories are below 5k
rupees, 5k-10k rupees, and above 10k rupees average monthly income. 5k rupees correspond
to about $60 US. The middle category of 5k-10k rupees can be roughly thought of as the
lower end of middle income in India.
1.4.5. Merging Datasets
Generally, gram panchayat level data in India do not have numeric identification codes,
which means that datasets must be merged using gram panchayat names. However, gram
panchayat names are often spelled and denoted differently across years and datasets, making
it difficult to achieve perfect matches. In order to merge the datasets that are given in
different geographic units, I create concordance between village and gram panchayats using
the high-resolution Rural-Urban Geographic Platform for India (SHRUG) dataset (Asher
et al. (2019)) and the Local Government Directory (LGD) 13. The SHRUG data organizes
census data with unique identifiers called shrid, which describe stable units of area overtime
and can be merged into India villages easily. The LGD data includes a crosswalk between
villages and gram panchayats names. The two datasets combined act as my concordance
13https://lgdirectory.gov.in/
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key where I use fuzzy matching to connect gram panchayat level data with my concordance
data.
1.4.6. Sample
For my analysis I use gram panchayats for which I have information throughout both rounds
of panchayat election. This leaves me with a balanced panel for Uttar Pradesh and Ra-
jasthan. I exclude scheduled areas, as political posts are always reserved for scheduled
tribes, which is not discussed in this paper.14 Statistics for the sample at the gram pan-
chayat level are in Table 1.2. Table 1.2 panel A contains baseline demographic data on
gram panchayats and panel B, NREGS outcome variables. The baseline data come from
SHRUGS, 2001 census data, and 2011 caste census (for the number of households by caste).
The first two columns of the these two tables show the average and standard deviation
for the overall sample, the next two are by MLA reservation status, and the last two by
sarpanch reservation status. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
There are around 5-10 villages per gram panchayat and around 40-130 gram panchayats
within an assembly. Table A.1.1 shows detailed statistics about the number of households
and population for the sample. The households data comes from the 2011 caste census and
the population based on the 2001 census. On average about 24 percent of the gram pan-
chayats are reserved for SC in my sample and 22 percent are included in assemblies reserved
for SC. At the mean, we see that gram panchayats that are in SC reserved MLAs are smaller
and have a higher fraction of SC population compared to those in MLAs not reserved for
SC. Similar goes for gram panchayats reserved for SC compared to those not reserved for SC.
In Table 1.2 panel B, I examine total number of households that work in a given month and
gram panchayat. I further break this down by the SC households and non-SC households.
14Scheduled tribes are not discussed for two main reasons. First, many gram panchayats simply do not have
any scheduled tribe households. Secondly, some states do not have caste reservation for scheduled tribes.
For example, in Uttar Pradesh, no assembly is reserved for scheduled tribes.
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On average around 25 households work monthly, which is about 6% of all households. We
also see that SC households, on average, are more reliant on NREGS jobs. Although SC
households are about a quarter of the total households, about a third of all NREGS work is
done by SC households. Total worked days is a sum of all the days of work generated within
a month and gram panchayat. It reflects the total amount of work generated monthly at
the gram panchayat. This variable is also divided into whether these days were worked by
SC households or not. Approximately 367 total work-days are generated, of which about
99 days are worked by SC households.
1.5. Empirical Strategy
With randomization of castes at both levels, we can simply look at the interaction effects
of the sarpanch and MLA’s castes. Given that this is not the case, a naive regression
could be subject to omitted variables bias. For example, gram panchayats with both SC
sarpanch and SC MLA might be places where SC have more political power. In this case, the
representatives’ caste can be measuring the political power of SC rather than the effects of
alignment in representation. Also, we can imagine that SC representation at both levels can
signify higher levels of poverty, which means that we may be measuring the effects of greater
demand. In both cases, the effects of SC alignment in representation will be biased upwards.
To get around this problem, I employ a triple-difference strategy using caste changes driven
by political reservation. In my sample period, there were local elections for both Uttar
Pradesh and Rajasthan. Moreover, only some gram panchayats have assemblies reserved
for SC. This setting creates three components that enable a triple-difference strategy: (1)
gram panchayat reservation changes across geography for each term independent of assem-
bly caste reservation; (2) gram panchayat reservation changes over time as the rules do
not permit consecutive reservation for any gram panchayat; and (3) assembly reservations
status vary across location. I will show that my setting satisfies parallel trends assumption
through graphical analyses in section 2.4.1.
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Figure 1.4(a) illustrates an example of how local reservation can rotate over time. Each
rectangle represents a gram panchayat and the borders signify boundaries of gram panchay-
ats. SC and NSC each denote gram panchayats reserved for SC and not reserved for SC,
respectively, and the SC reserved areas are colored in blue. The numbers in parentheses
show the SC population for the gram panchayats. The left side of the figure is at t = 0
and the right half is at t = 1, which is after a local election. In the left side of the fig-
ure, we see that the gram panchayats with the three largest SC population are reserved
for SC. Post election, at t = 1 we see that three gram panchayats with the next largest
SC populations are reserved. In sum, we see there is variation in both time an geogra-
phy in gram panchayat reservation. Next, panel (b) of figure 1.4 shows the same figure
as (a) but with a focus on assembly borders shown in thicker lines. The thick red solid
borders highlighting the first two columns of gram panchayats show the SC reserved assem-
bly. The last column with thick black borders is a non-SC reserved assembly. There are
few noteworthy points. One is that unlike sarpanch reservation, MLA reservation remains
stable over time. Next, I shaded gram panchayats that have both SC sarpanch and MLA.
We see that while the first two gram panchayats in the first row are shaded in t = 0, in
t = 1, two different gram panchayats are shaded. In other words, due to the rotating nature
of gram panchayat reservations, caste alignment of representatives vary over areas and time.
With these variations in hand, I can estimate the following:
Yijst = β0 + β1postst × localSCijst × InterSCijs
+ β2postst × localSCijst + β3postst × InterSCijs + ηijs + δst + εijst (1.1)
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Data is at the gram-panchayat, assembly, state, and month-year level, where Yijst is the
outcome variable of interest measuring NREGS job distribution in gram panchayat i, as-
sembly j, state s, and month-year t. The main outcome variable I analyze is the total
number of work-days generated in a given gram panchayat-month-year. I will further break
down the total days into those worked by only SC households and those by non-SC house-
holds. postst = 1 if the month-year is after the sarpanch election (i.e. after the 2015 Uttar
Pradesh election and 2016 after the Rajasthan election). localSCijst = 1 if gram panchayat
i is becomes reserved for SC. InterSCijs is an indicator for gram panchayat i belonging to
an SC reserved assembly j. Note that the MLA status does not vary by time. ηijs are gram
panchayat level fixed effects and δst state-date fixed effects. With gram panchayat fixed
effects, I am able measure variation within gram panchayats.
β1 is the coefficient of interest and shows triple-difference effects. It measures the differential
effect of a gram panchayat becoming reserved SC in an SC reserved assembly compared to
the effect in a non-SC reserved assembly. In other words, we can see if there is a statistically
significant difference in effects of SC gram panchayat reservation if there is caste alignment
across the two tiers of the government or not. β2 measures the difference-in-differences
effect of gram panchayat SC reservation when it belongs to a non-SC reserved assembly.
β1 + β2 is the difference-in-differences estimate of being reserved for an SC sarpanch when
MLA is also SC. Note that all estimations correspond to intent-to-treat effects as I am using
reservation status rather than actual caste of the representatives. All standard errors are
clustered at the assembly level as outcome residuals are likely to be correlated for gram
panchayats within a same assembly.
1.6. Results
The triple-difference estimates based on equation 1.1 are in Table 1.3, where the first column
shows results for all monthly NREGS work-days regardless of caste, and column (2) and (3)
broken down into days worked by only SC households and non-SC households respectively.
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The richness of the NREGS data allows me to explore exact benefits constituents receive
depending on their caste. Note that the outcome is the sum of days generated within a
gram panchayat monthly. It is different from the per-capita number of days of work. All
estimates include state-time fixed effects for state-specific time trends and gram panchayat
fixed effects for within gram panchayat comparisons. I report outcome variable means and
number of unique gram panchayats as well.
The interpretation of column (1)’s coefficient on localSC × post is as follows: when a
gram panchayat has a non-SC MLA, SC reservation of a gram panchayat leads to about
54 (p<0.01) fewer total days of work monthly compared to when there is non-SC reserved
sarpanch and MLA. That is, overall, with intergovernmental misalignment fewer work-days
are generated. The triple-difference coefficient explains if there is a differential effect within
a given gram panchayat from SC reservation of gram panchayats when their assemblies are
also reserved for SC. Column (1)’s triple-difference coefficient shows us that the effect of
gram panchayat SC reservation is 37 work-days larger on average when there is caste align-
ment compared to when there is not. I’ve discussed how the overall supply of jobs changes
with misalignment, but we are more interested in what happens to the minority caste, SC,
households.
Column (2)’s second row demonstrates us that there are no statistically significant effects
to SC households from having a SC reserved sarpanch when the MLA is non-SC. This
result is important as it matches results from papers that do not find effects of sarpanch
reservation15. It is possible that these findings come from heavy sampling from non-SC as-
sembly areas. However, we see from the triple-difference coefficient that with SC alignment
in both levels, there are 17 (p<0.05) more SC work-days generated. This is approximately
17 percent of the average SC work-days. This implies that local representation of minority
15E.g. Dunning and Nilekani (2013) and Jensenius (2015)
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castes can increase transfers to minority castes conditional on there being caste alignment
with the upper-level government, or the MLA. Finally, column (3) gives us an insight into
how SC work-days are unaffected with caste misalignment when there is an overall decrease
in total work-days. We see from the second row that non-SC households work about 58
(p<0.01) fewer work-days with SC sarpanch reservation and non-SC MLA. It appears SC
sarpanches shift jobs from non-SC households to SC households under a non-SC MLA.
Overall, the results suggest that intergovernmental misalignment is associated with fewer
work-days. Moreover, while minority representation can benefit minorities, but not when
upper-level representation is misaligned with the lower-level representation. In A.1.2, the
outcome variables is monthly number of households that worked NREGS job within a gram
panchayat. The results show positive and significant SC alignment effects on number of
households that worked NREGS households. Moreover, overall, more households work with
SC alignment.
Given that I am analyzing data at levels, there might be concerns that the results can
be driven by outliers. To address this potential threat, I analyze my data with outcome
variables winsorized at the 99 percent level. While the coefficient size decreases, results
remain significant and qualitatively the same as it can be seen in appendix table A.1.3,
suggesting that the results are not driven by few outliers. Although gram panchayat fixed
effects are included, hence, I use changes within gram panchayat, there may be concerns
that the findings are coming from differences in population sizes. In appendix table A.1.4 I
include baseline controls including number of total households, number of SC households,
and physical size of gram panchayats interacted with the "post" indicator variable to allow
differences in trends. The inclusion of these controls do not affect the results qualitatively
and the findings remain significant.
I show these results graphically in an event studies setting in figure 1.5. "0" is the year of
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gram panchayat elections, hence the year of "treatment" for gram panchayats that become
reserved for SC. I show three years before and after the election, years for which I have the
full 12 months of data. The base or reference year is the year before sarpanch elections.
While the effect sizes make the changes in trend not very transparent, we can confirm
parallel pre-trends of the triple-difference estimates. The black solid lines show effects of
SC reservation of gram panchayats for those with SC MLAs. The black dashed lines show
the 90% confidence intervals. The red lines show effects of SC gram panchayat reservation
for areas with non-SC MLAs and the red dotted lines correspond to the coefficients’ 90%
confidence intervals. The triple-difference coefficients correspond to the difference of these
two lines.
In panel (a), I show results for sum of work days created. We see that, before election, the
differences between the two lines are negligible and not statistically significant. While the
triple-difference estimations are noisy, we see that after sarpanch election, gram panchayats
reserved for SC under non-MLAs experience a significant drop in overall work-days and
this pattern continues, suggesting an overall shrinking of the pie. This visualizes to the
difference-in-differences result for non-SC MLAs from column (1) in 1.3. We do not see
significant changes for SC MLA gram panchayats. In 1.5(b), I show event study results
for SC households work-days. We similarly see parallel pre-trends before election. Unlike
in panel (a), we do not see a dramatic decrease in SC work-days in non-SC MLA areas.
Instead, there is a increase in SC work-days after SC gram panchayat reservation in aligned
areas. The difference between the two coefficients are statistically significant a year after
election, but the gap decreases over time. The minimal changes in trends for non-SC MLA
areas correspond to the difference-in-differences coefficient from column (2) in 1.3. Finally,
panel (c) shows results for non-SC work-days. We see that regardless of alignment, SC
sarpanches lead to lower work-days for non-SC households. Overall, the graphs confirm
parallel pre-trends and display similar qualitative results as the regression results in table
1.3. That is, representation of minority castes is effective in increasing transfers to minorities
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when there is also alignment in caste with the upper-level government. With misalignment,
the overall capacity of NREGS distribution decreases, resulting in SC sarpanches not being
able to allocate more jobs to SC households.
1.7. Heterogeneity Analyses
In this section, I describe possible sources of heterogeneity. I will discuss heterogeneity
coming from electoral motivation, taste, and information.
First, electoral motivation can be affect jobs distribution since NREGS may be used as a re-
election tool for politicians. An important point, however, is that gram panchayats reserved
for SC are extremely unlikely to be reserved again in the election cycle directly after. Given
voting patterns that usually follow caste lines and the fact that SCs are usually minorities,
even at the gram panchayat level, there is a low chance for SC sarpanches to be re-elected.
Consequently, it is difficult to claim that SC sarpanches have re-election motivations.
On the other hand, the incentives for SC MLAs are clearer as their reservation status
stays stable over time. With MLAs being aware of the allocation patterns of the sarpanch
depending on caste, it is more beneficial for MLAs to focus on gram panchayats with
same-caste sarpanches as their efforts will have less "leakage." Additionally, given the lower
economics status of SC, SC households are more "swingable" through NREGS jobs for their
marginal utility of an additional job is likely to be larger than that of non-SC households.
Under these assumptions an SC MLA can allocate more jobs that can translate to votes with
an SC alignment. Thus, we would expect greater effects of SC alignment for SC households
in areas with higher election competition. I measure political competition by the difference
in share of votes between the winner and runner-up in the last MLA election. We would
expect greater political competition with smaller vote-share difference. I use this measure
of political competition for quadruple-differences:
26
Yijst =β0 + β1postst × localSCijst × InterSCijs
+ β2postst × localSCijst + β3postst × InterSCijs
+ β4localSCijst × dijst + β5InterSCijs × dijst
+ β6localSCijst × postst × dijst
+ β7InterSCijs× postst × dijst
+ β8localSCijst × InterSCijs× postst × dijst + δst + εijst (1.2)
dijst is the vote difference and here the quadruple-difference coefficient is β8. It captures
heterogeneity of SC alignment effects coming from political competition. The results are
in table 1.4. Again, the outcome variables are sum of work days created in a gram pan-
chayat each month where column (1) shows the overall total, and columns (2) and (3)
show work days for SC and non-SC households respectively. I report only the quadruple-
difference coefficients for brevity. The number of observations and unique gram panchayats
are smaller than that of table 1.3 as not all gram panchayats have election results. Column
(2) shows that there is a statistically significant (p<0.05) and positive effect of political
competition on SC work days for SC aligned gram panchayats. Specifically, a one stan-
dard deviation decrease in previous election’s vote difference between winner and runner-up
leads to 11 more SC work days with SC alignment. That is, more electoral competition and
thus, more accountability, is correlated with more transfers to SC households in SC-aligned
gram panchyats. We do not see meaningful changes in NREGS work allocation to non-SC
households. Although quadruple-difference estimates are likely noisy, results for non-SC
households show that effect sizes are rather small as well.
For the channel of taste, I test whether taste for own group affects job allocation. To test
this hypothesis, I use caste protests that happened in April, 2018 and affected my sam-
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ple states particularly 16. The protests occurred against the supreme court’s ruling that
have said to weaken the protection of lower-castes. Importantly, protests, which lasted not
more than a week should not have changed the need for jobs abruptly and differentially
depending on caste alignment. On the other hand, it is possible that the animosity of SC
against non-SC increased the salience of castes, amplifying effects of misalignment. Using
an event that can increase group salience is a method Fisman et al. (2019), Hjort (2014),
Shayo and Zussman (2011) also use to show the channel of taste. To observe responses right
around the protest, I estimate effects of caste alignment right before and after protests in
2018, and compare these coefficients with that of other non-protest years, hence, estimating
quadruple-differences.
The graphical results are in figure 1.6. Panel (a) shows event study results for total work-
days generated, (b) SC work-days, and (c) non-SC work-days. The black lines correspond
to coefficients for protest year (2018) and the red lines are for non-protest years post local
elections. All coefficients are in relation to March as the protests happened in April. We
are interested in the differences between the two lines. The only outcome that shows a
clear differential pattern is work-days allocated to SC households. We see that a month
after protest there is a large jump in SC work-days in SC aligned gram panchayats com-
pared to misaligned areas during protest year compared to non-protest years. The changes
are marginally statistically significant for May and months September through November
despite the coefficients being quadruple-differences. We do not see significant differences
between protest year and non-protest years for non-SC work-days. This is consistent with
the channel of taste as an increase in caste salience can lead to more own-caste favoritism. It
is possible that the animosity in caste relations affected employment of SC households, but




Better information exchange between own-caste can also be a channel. That is, perhaps,
there is better information share between sarpanches and households or sarpanches and
MLAs in the same caste. Given that better information exchange is one of the arguments
for decentralization one can expect might expect better targeting for own-caste as well. In
order to examine this, I estimate equation 1.1 with work days generated for below poverty
line (BPL) households and fraction of work days alloted to BPL households. BPL status
is determined by local governments and the most recent criteria in 2014 states that the
poverty line should be 32 rupees made a day in rural areas. That is, people can be consid-
ered below poverty line if they earn less than 32 rupees a day. If we see better targeting,
there should be a larger number of own-caste BPL work days. While BPL is an imperfect
measure of poverty, it can proxy for those most in need of NREGS jobs.
Table 1.5 shows the triple-difference effects of on BPL targeting. Columns (1)-(3) show the
raw number of BPL work days and (4)-(6) fraction of work days going to BPL households.
From the first three columns, we see no meaningful effects of alignment in BPL work days.
In fact, column (5)’s triple-difference coefficient shows a lower fraction of SC work days
going SC BPL households. In other words, even though we see an increase in SC work
days from alignment in SC representation as seen in table 1.3, the increase are not coming
from SC BPL households – households that might need NREGS work the most. This result
is inconsistent with the information channel. Column (3)’s coefficient on LocalSC × post
suggest that SC sarpanches lead to decrease in work for non-SC BPL households. However,
this appears to be from overall decrease in non-SC work days as column (6) shows that the
fraction of non-SC BPL work days actually increase slightly (p<0.01) with SC sarpanches.
Generally, the effect sizes are rather small, suggesting negligible effects on targeting.
1.8. Conclusion
Decentralization can grant poor minority groups a chance of political representation. How-
ever, evidence on whether political representation actually benefits the poor is mixed. Given
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that decentralized governments rely on the cooperation and delegation of more than one
tier of government officials, focusing on representation at one level in isolation can miss an
important source heterogeneity.
In this paper, I provide evidence that decentralization can promote the needs of minorities
when there is alignment in group across intergovernmental levels. The setting of India is
appropriate to study my question as I have detailed data on both the group or caste of rep-
resentatives and group of households receiving transfers. Additionally, India’s caste system
that created historical and ongoing inequality created easily identifiable minority groups.
The caste reservation system provides exogenous variation in representation as well. Fi-
nally, India’s rural job guarantee program, NREGS, is the world’s largest welfare program
and this is an important program in itself. I show that they can be explained through the
channels of electoral competition and taste for in-group members.
This paper suggests that the existence of own-group bias can be amplified or negated with
a decentralized government structure. Hence, assessment of representation may not be
straightforward. In my context, SC households receive 17 more days of work (this corre-
sponds to around 17 percent of average monthly work) at the gram panchayat level monthly
when both local and intermediate representatives are SC. Having SC representation only
at the local level does not increase transfers to SC households since the overall capacity of
NREGS distribution decreases with caste misalignment.
Moreover, I explored sources of heterogeneity including taste, electoral motivation, and in-
formation. I show that taste for own-caste can be a driving factor behind my results using
changes in caste salience through caste protests. Also, by using vote differences in previous
election as a proxy for political competition, I see that MLA re-election motives can lead to
increased transfers to own-group. This pattern is pronounced for SC households as they are
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more swingable through government transfers. However, with very low sarapnch re-election
prospects without reservation, the rotation of gram panchayat reservation decreases elec-
toral motivation for sarpanches. If re-election motivation also strengthens SC sarpanches’
transfer to minority castes at the gram panchayat level, it may be worthwhile to explore
increasing re-election possibilities for SC sarpanches. Finally, I do not see evidence that
being affected by better information within own-group. It is important to point out that
while these results suggest possible mechanisms, I am not able to show exact causes behind
my findings.
My findings have policy implications as well. In the context of India, the caste reservation
system was instated to promote the status of minority castes. Political posts are reserved
independently at each level of government. Yet, according to my findings, without the sup-
port of upper level officials, a sarpanch’s effort might not be sufficient to provide greater
transfers to minority castes may not occur. Thus, for the Indian government, if increasing
minority castes’ access to resources is a goal, coordination of reservation across different
seats may be needed.
There are futures areas of research needed to understand the full story behind my findings.
First, it would be useful to have a theoretical model that can deepen the understanding
of the channels behind the effects of intergovernmental group alignment. Second, while
my findings can speak directly to allocation within local level, the paper’s design does not
allow me to make causal claims for intermediate representatives’ decisions. Supplementing
the data with explicit allocation decisions of intermediate representatives can be helpful.




Table 1.1: Example of Theoretical Reservation Rotation
GP pop SC theory reserved 2010 theory reserved 2015
A 120 Y N
B 110 Y N
C 90 Y N
D 80 Y N
E 75 N Y
F 70 N Y
G 60 N Y
H 58 N Y
I 50 N N
J 45 N N
This table illustrates an example of a gram panchayat reservation process for scheduled castes (SC). In this
example, we assume that 40 percent or four out of these ten gram panchayats have to be reserved. Column
"pop SC" has scheduled caste population. Theory reserved 2010, 2015 show whether a gram panchayat
should be theoretically reserved ("Y") or not ("N") in election years 2010 and 2015, respectively. Note that
the gram panchayats have been listed in descending order of SC population. In 2010, we see that the first four
are theoretically reserved. In 2015, the next four gram panchayats are reserved, and this pattern continues
on with 2020 having the last two (I, J) and first two gram panchayats (A, B) reserved.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
All Assembly SC Assembly Non-SC GP SC GP Non-SC
A. Panchayat Statistics
pop 2649.84 (1678.79) 2520.07 (1524.24) 2675.15 (1706.15) 2340.79 (1322.19) 2691.60 (1717.05)
SC Population 549.25 (445.78) 681.13 (529.26) 523.52 (422.83) 778.45 (471.26) 517.63 (432.71)
Total HH 416.76 (278.78) 394.53 (249.90) 421.09 (283.87) 373.94 (233.92) 422.47 (283.65)
SC HH 108.97 (95.05) 127.03 (108.38) 105.34 (91.70) 141.02 (99.06) 104.55 (93.57)
Non-SC HH 398.85 (284.42) 351.45 (254.04) 408.38 (289.21) 310.14 (239.92) 410.78 (287.65)
Literate Population 1152.26 (836.76) 1123.59 (717.10) 1157.86 (858.05) 1040.71 (663.30) 1167.26 (856.25)
area (sqr-km) 5.73 (8.01) 4.72 (5.05) 5.92 (8.45) 5.23 (7.12) 5.79 (8.12)
unique GP 6126.00 (0.00) 1000.00 (0.00) 5126.00 (0.00) 1438.00 (0.00) 6126.00 (0.00)
B. NREGS Variables
Total Worked Households 25.21 (66.32) 20.07 (39.06) 26.22 (70.38) 26.08 (63.86) 25.09 (66.66)
Worked HH (non-SC) 18.12 (54.24) 11.94 (26.96) 19.32 (58.01) 16.51 (52.54) 18.34 (54.47)
Worked HH (SC) 7.10 (17.10) 8.12 (16.95) 6.90 (17.12) 9.57 (18.99) 6.75 (16.79)
Total Worked Days 367.46 (1168.49) 283.21 (686.15) 383.89 (1240.26) 384.92 (1126.53) 364.98 (1174.21)
Worked Days (SC) 98.91 (289.67) 109.58 (273.97) 96.83 (292.59) 133.58 (318.89) 94.12 (285.11)
Worked Days (non-SC) 268.55 (954.67) 173.63 (482.64) 287.07 (1020.61) 251.35 (927.41) 270.86 (958.42)
Observations 588096 96000 492096 71037 516756
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 1.3: Triple-Difference Effects on Days Worked
Days Worked
(1) (2) (3)
tot days SC non-SC
Inter SC × Local SC × post 37.32∗ 17.17∗∗ 20.15
(19.69) (7.38) (16.58)
Local SC × post -53.94∗∗∗ 4.31 -58.24∗∗∗
(13.70) (3.60) (11.82)
Inter SC × post -25.28 5.96 -31.24
(29.91) (10.03) (24.21)
Observations 588096 588096 588096
R2 0.441 0.373 0.444
outcome mean 367.46 98.91 268.55
state-time FE X X X
GP FE X X X
unique GP 6126 6126 6126
Standard errors clustered at assembly level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The outcome variables reflect the monthly summation of number of days worked in a given gram panchayat
monthly. Note that this is not equivalent to per-household work-days. The first column shows results
for all monthly NREGS work-days, and column (2) and (3) are broken down into days worked by only
SC households and non-SC households respectively. The first row of coefficients show the triple-difference
effects. All estimates include state-time fixed effects and gram panchayat fixed effects. I report outcome
variable means and number of unique gram panchayats as well. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.4: Effects of Political Competition
Work Days
(1) (2) (3)
tot days SC non-SC
diff vote × Inter SC × Local SC × post -1.875 -1.362∗∗ -0.512
(2.757) (0.650) (2.445)
Observations 477,748 477,748 477,748
R2 0.427 0.354 0.432
outcome mean 308.959 86.066 222.893
state-time FE Yes Yes Yes
GP FE Yes Yes Yes
unique GP 5,756 5,756 5,756
Standard errors clustered at assembly level
This table shows heterogeneity effects from electoral competition. "diff vote" is the percentage-point dif-
ference between MLA and the runner-up from previous MLA election. The outcome variables are sum of
monthly work days created in a gram panchayat where column (1) shows the overall total, and columns (2)
and (3) show work days for SC and non-SC households respectively. I report only the quadruple-difference
coefficients for brevity. Model includes all triple-difference interactions and diff vote, Inter SC×diff vote, Lo-
cal SC×diff vote, Inter SC×Local SC×diff vote, diff vote×post, Inter SC×diff vote×post, and Local SC×diff
vote×post. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.5: Triple-Difference Effects on BPL Targeting
BPL Work Days Fraction BPL Work Days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
tot days SC non-SC tot days SC non-SC
Inter SC × Local SC × post 3.295 1.292 0.909 -0.015∗∗ -0.018∗ -0.013
(2.495) (1.724) (1.781) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Local SC × post -4.632∗∗ -1.496 -3.013∗∗ 0.011∗∗ -0.002 0.015∗∗∗
(2.098) (1.045) (1.248) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Inter SC × post -1.270 -0.467 -0.235 0.011 0.002 0.012
(4.030) (1.354) (3.178) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 588,096 588,096 588,096 321,599 265,673 310,181
R2 0.373 0.325 0.348 0.675 0.688 0.618
outcome mean 49.428 18.858 25.703 0.163 0.219 0.132
state-time FE X X X X X X
GP FE X X X X X X
unique GP 6,126 6,126 6,126 5,733 5,602 5,730
Standard errors clustered at assembly level
Columns (1)-(3) outcome variables are the number of work days allocated to below poverty line (BPL)
households and columns (4)-(6) show fraction of work days going to BPL households. Column (1) shows
sum of work-days alloted to BPL households overall, and columns (2) and (3) reflect work days for SC and
non-SC BPL households respectively. The number of observations across columns (4)-(6) vary because the
fractions are conditional on there being any work-days alloted overall, to SC households, and to non-SC
households in order. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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1.10. Figures
Figure 1.1: Government Structure
This figure shows a simplified structure of the Indian government. The two positions in interest are the
members of legislative assembly (MLA) and the sarpanches. MLAs are part of the state legislative assembly
and a sarpanch is the head of the the gram panchayat. The two positions are highlighted with red boxes
around them. Note that the state legislative assembly, hence, the MLAs are hierarchically above sarpanches
that gover gram panchayats.
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Figure 1.2: Roles of MLA and sarpanch
This diagram shows the relationship between MLA and sarpanch for NREGS implementation. While MLAs
affect overall capacity of the scheme, the sarpanch can target households in distributing NREGS jobs.
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Figure 1.3: Allocation Example
This figure shows how NREGS jobs can be allocated to households in a decentralized government such as
that of India. (S) refers to SC and (N) to non-SC. The numbers represent number of jobs to be distributed.
"Intermediate" refers to MLAs in this case, and "Local" refers to sarpanches. The last row demonstrates
final allocation to households by caste. For the purposes of this figure, we will assume that representatives
at both levels distribute more jobs to own-caste at 4-to-1 ratio. The left-hand side of the tree represents
allocation process for an SC MLA, who has 100 jobs to allocate. The right-hand side of the tree is when





These figures represent the reservation system for gram panchayats and assemblies. Rectangles with "SC"
denote SC reserved gram panchayats and "NSC" those that are not reserved for SC. The SC reserved gram
panchayats are also colored in blue. In panel (a), the numbers in parentheses denote SC population in each
gram panchayat. We see that the selection of gram panchayats reserved changes after a local election (from
t = 0 to t = 1). Panel (b) focuses on assembly reservation. The thick borders represent assembly boundaries
and the assembly in solid red is reserved for SC. We see that assembly reservation status does not change
overtime. Finally, the shaded rectangles show the gram panchayats that have both SC sarpanch and MLA.
The rotating nature of gram panchayat reservation means that over time, intergovernmental alignments
change.
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Each panel shows the triple-differences coefficients for each outcome variable. "0" is the year of gram
panchayat elections, hence the year of "treatment" for gram panchayats that become reserved for SC. I show
three years before and after the election. The base year is the year before sarpanch elections. The black
solid lines show effects of SC reservation of gram panchayats for those with SC MLAs. The black dotted
lines show the 90% confidence intervals. The red lines show effects of SC gram panchayat reservation for
areas with non-SC MLAs and the red dotted lines correspond to the coefficients’ 90% confidence intervals.
The triple-difference coefficients correspond to the difference of these two lines. In panel (a), I show results
for sum of work days created. In panel (b), I show event study results for SC household work-days. We
similarly see parallel trends before election. Finally panel (c) shows results for non-SC work-days.
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Year of Protest Other Years
The graphs show effects of caste alignment right before and after protests in 2018, and compare the effects
with those of other non-protest years. Panel (a) shows event study results for total work-days generated,
(b) SC work-days, and (c) non-SC work-days. The black lines correspond to coefficients for protest year
(2018) and the red lines are for non-protest years. All coefficients are in relation to March of each year as
the protests happened in April.
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CHAPTER 2 : Does Local Government Structure Matter? Investigation Through
India
2.1. Introduction
There are many initiatives and grants that target improvement of specific public goods. For
example, Modi is launching City Gas Projects across 129 districts to improve availability of
clean cooking fuel or Piped Natural Gas for consumers 1. In Indonesia, there was the Keca-
matan Development Project that (KDP) – a government project funded through the World
Bank that annually financed projects in villages, usually infrastructure projects. Naturally,
much attention is focused on evaluating the efficacy of these programs and potential pitfalls
implementation (e.g. corruption in Olken (2007) for KDP’s case). However, what is not
often considered is the role, if any, of local government structure in effectively implementing
these programs.
The question of whether local government structure influences policy implementation has
been an ongoing debate with little systematic research (Hughes et al. (1991); Benton
(2003b)2). If local government structure matters, policy makers should take into consider-
ation how the government structure interacts with future policies and whether the current
structure is the best for the nation. In this paper, I address this question of whether local
government structure affects public goods provision and if so, how. In order to do this, I
exploit the distinct nature of rural and urban local governments in India.
India is suitable to answer this question because of the vastly different structures between
rural and urban local governments. The rural and local governments are the smallest self




2For a list of papers that contribute to this debate please refer to the literature in this paper.
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presence and roles of these local governments were constituionalized after the implementa-
tion of 73rd (for rural) and 74th (fur urban) amendments in 1992 and 1993 respectively. I
use the urban and rural local government designation for variation in governance structure.
Each rural local government is composed of villages while each urban local government is
composed of wards. In general, while the rural local government is more informal and less
structured, the urban local government has better defined roles. Rural local governments
have a hierarchical three-tier system at the settlement, sub-district, and district levels,
from lowest to highest in hierarchy. I focus on the settlement level rural local government
throughout the paper as it is a comparable level of local government to the urban local
government. On the other hand, for urban local governments there is no hierarchy. Given
the hierarchical nature, communication between local officials and the state government is
harder for settlement level rural local government officials.
Also, the suggested functions differ, with rural local governments’ functions being more agri-
culture focused and urban local governments’ functions addressing more urban issues such
as, planning and slum improvement. Importantly, while state governments can allow both
types of governments the authority to collect taxes, urban local governments are more likely
to collect taxes and impose stricter regulations and fees for businesses and constituents.
The decision of which settlement to make rural or urban is not arbitrary. While the de-
cision is meant to rely on objective measures of urbanization, often times politics and
path-dependence are determining factors as well. Throughout the paper, I call areas with
urban governments "admin urban" and rural local governments "admin rural."
One of the main concerns with using the rural and urban designation is that I am simply
looking at the effects of urbanization on public goods provision. To isolate the effects of
government structure on local public goods provision, first, I employ a control strategy using
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satellite data to measure extent of urbanization. Daylight satellite data’s uses in economics
have been increasing, mainly to identify urbanization (Dingel et al. (2019); Baragwanath
Vogel et al. (2018)). Moreover, I flexibly control for observables such as, population, den-
sity and socioeconomic variables such as, fraction literature within a settlement. Finally,
in order to allow for selection on unobservable characteristics at the district level I include
district fixed effects. I find that despite the inclusion of these controls and fixed effects,
urban local governments give better access to local public goods across multiple variables
and independent of the source of satellite data I use to measure urbanization. I also provide
results for placebo tests that show that the government structure does not directly impact
access to private goods. While I do not provide results here, matching strategy also shows
consistent findings.
Next I turn to mechanisms behind these results. I claim that financial decentralization is
a channel for better access in public goods for admin urban areas. I use West Bengal’s
local government level revenue data to show that admin urban areas have a higher level of
reliance on own-source revenue as opposed to central and state government transfers. Con-
sistent with Martinez (2018) and Gadenne (2017), I find that higher levels of own-source
reliance is associated with better access to public goods.
Finally, I provide heterogeneity tests. I find that compared to an admin urban area that
does not neighbor other admin urban settlements, an admin urban area with neighboring
admin urban areas experience less of an increase in public goods access. I argue that this
result is due to spillover effects. That is, admin urban areas that neighbor other admin
urban areas were already enjoying spillover effects even prior to becoming admin urban
themselves. As a result, the benefit of becoming admin urban is less dramatic. I support
this argument by showing that settlements that neighbor admin urban areas are less likely
to become admin urban possibly because the citizens already access admin amenities due
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to spillovers with lower taxes, thereby, being resistant to changing their government status.
I contribute to the literature examining whether local government structure affects public
service provision in several ways. As mentioned before, there is little systematic and empir-
ical investigation in this area. In addition, most of these papers look at developed countries.
I complement existing literature by filling in the gap of the lack of research on governance
structure in developing countries and employing empirical methods to provide a systematic
within-country investigation. More recent papers started to speak to developing countries’
local government structure. Closely related is Hiranandani (2018). Like this paper, the au-
thor investigates the differences in rural and urban governments’ development indicators in
India and finds better levels of "high spillover" development indicators, which include road
length, fire service, and drainage, for urban governments. I further this research by utilizing
the entire sample of India rather than limiting my sample to urban areas and effectively
controlling for urbanization through satellite data. The World Bank has a report (GSURR
and Frontier (2015)) that also investigates the role of urban government but does not find
any effect on public goods access. However, this report mainly looks at a small number of
cases through matching, without giving a comprehensive overview of India. Importantly,
unlike the recent literature, I explore mechanisms through which governance can matter.
This paper also speaks to the financial decentralization literature by exploring decentral-
ization channels. I am able to speak to the effects of financial decentralization using unique
data from West Bengal, bolstering the findings of Martinez (2018) and Gadenne (2017).
While the authors mainly discuss education, the variety of my outcome variables are able
to show that the effects of greater financial decentralization applies to many aspects of
public services outside of education. While it is not the focus of this paper, I also innovate
by finding a novel usage of satellite data as a control for urbanization.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 provides background on India’s local
governance structure and reasons for why it is an attractive setting for this study. Section
2.3 presents the estimation framework for the effect of admin urban and Section 2.4 shows
results of the empirical exercises Section 2.5 provides evidence on mechanisms and Section
2.6 heterogeneity effects. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2. Setting and Background
The 73rd and 74th amendments that were put into effect in 1992 and 1993 mark the constitu-
tional beginning of decentralization and self-governance in India. Prior to the amendments,
local governance was entirely dependent on the states. As a result, local governance varied
widely across states. The amendments detail that every settlement needs to be represented
by panchayats (for rural areas) or municipalities (for urban areas), which are the small-
est level of self-governance. Moreover, through these amendments, the distinction between
rural and urban local governments became clearer. I will call areas with an urban local gov-
ernment "admin urban" and areas with a rural local government "admin rural" throughout
this paper.
2.2.1. Difference between urban/rural local governments
Broadly, urban local governments have more autonomy from the state governments and are
structurally more well-defined than rural local governments. The rural local government has
a hierarchical three-tier structure with village (gram panchayats), block (or sub-district),
and district governments in order of hierarchy collectively known as the Panchayat Raj
Institutions. Given this structure, often times the lower level local government has to get
clearance from the upper level before making decisions. On the other hand, urban local
governments have a horizontal structure. There are three different types of urban local gov-
ernments but they do not have a hierarchical relationship. In order of size, there are nagar
panchayats, municipalities, and municipal corporations. An implication of this structural
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difference is greater provisional autonomy for urban local governments.
A non-structural difference between urban and rural local governments come from the sup-
port from states. In general, many states have not transferred the required staff after
devolution of functions. Also, many government officers are not willing to work under the
administrative control of elected rural local officials. That is, while in theory, rural govern-
ments are self-governing, the state government do not give the sufficient support to enable
self-governance (Satyanarayana (2015)). On the other hand, the constitution states that
legislature of a state may, by law, provide members of persons having special knowledge or
experience in Municipal administration or urban areas.
Both types of local governments may technically be given authority to raise their own
revenue through taxes and fees. However, both, but especially the rural governments,
primarily rely on grants-in-aid from state/central government. For instance, in 1999-2000
0.04% of GDP was raised by rural local governments whereas 0.5% of GDP was raised by
urban local governments in 1999-2000 (Govinda Rao (2003)). Property taxes are the main
source of revenue from their tax revenue. I will discuss this in more detail in section 2.5.1.
2.2.2. Admin urban/rural designation and transition
According to the amendment, the Governor may designate an area as transitional, or nagar
panchayat (the smallest level of urban local government), "having regard to the population
of the area, the density of the population therein, the revenue generated for local administra-
tion, the percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities, the economic importance
or such other factors as he may deem fit." While the amendment does lay out these criteria
to be considered, they are neither concrete nor binding. Instead, concrete criteria depend
on the state, although not all states have these. Yet, even states with formal criteria, most
states do not actually follow through with their official transition criteria. I consulted a
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source who has worked through the transition of an area with a rural government to an
urban government. From his experience, the transition was largely politically motivated in
that politicians initiated the transition for potential personal gains with little to no consid-
eration of the official criteria for transition.
What are the motivations behind politicians wanting (or not wanting) to push for rural
to urban transition? This depends on the stakes of the politician. On one hand, some
politicians are fearful of giving up their fiefdom if their village gets absorbed into a larger
town or villages combine to become a town. In contrast, anecdotally, politicians who own
a lot of land in a rural settlement want to change the settlement’s status in hopes of land
value appreciation. Constituents also have a stake in the transition, mainly through the
increased taxes and fees. Those who support the transition do so in the hopes of better
service provision. However, some fear increase in taxation and loss of rural-targeted wel-
fare programs. Similarly for businesses, while there are hopes for better connectivity and
services there is also the fear of stricter regulations and increase in taxes and fees.
There can be potential confusion regarding urban areas because India has two separate
categories of "urban" settlements. Conventionally, the two categories are known as (1)
statutory towns and (2) census towns. Statutory towns are what I refer to as admin urban
areas. Census towns are towns only in the eyes of the Indian census. That is, they are not
designated or recognized as urban by the central or state government. Specifically, census
towns are "places which satisfied the following criteria: a minimum population of 5,000; at
least 75% of the male main working population engaged in non-agricultural pursuits; and
a density of population of at least 400 persons per sq km." Although these places show
the characteristics and problems of an urban settlement, since the state does not recognize
them as a city, they are governed as admin rural.
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2.2.3. Mismatch of De Jure and De Facto Urban Designation
Figure 2.2 is a satellite image of Jhalda in West Bengal. At first glance it looks very rural
with little development. Surprisingly, despite the looks of it, Jhalda is a municipality or
admin urban with an urban local government. In Figure 2.3 we have Panchpar, also in
West Bengal. Compared to Jhalda, we see a lot more development. Panchpara, however,
is actually a village with a rural government. These settlements are not one-off examples
and I will provide a more systematic overview of extent and pattern of these "mismatches"
in section 2.3.1.2. What are the effects of the mismatches? If local governance structure
matters for provision of public goods, the mismatch can potentially be causing inefficiencies
in allocation. India not only have two very different local government structures, but also
these governance structures might be incorrectly assigned, making it essential to understand
the roll of local governance, if any.
2.3. Empirical Strategy
The goal is to estimate the causal effect of different local governmental structures on public
goods provision. I use census data from India for years 2001 and 2011 to test the hypothesis
that local governmental structure has an effect on public goods provision. I exploit the fact
that India’s local governments are largely divided into rural and urban local governments
with vastly different structures. Given that the type of local government is not randomly
distributed across settlements, I cannot simply compare the level of public goods access
between admin urban and admin rural areas. In the following subsections, I go over the
data and discuss controls strategy and fixed effects.
2.3.1. Data
2.3.1.1. Public Goods and Socioeconomic Variables
The Indian census provides basic socioeconomic information about each settlement such as,
number of households and population. The census further contains socioeconomic variables,
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such as, fraction of Scheduled Caste/Tribe (SC/ST), fraction employed, fraction living in di-
lapidated houses, fraction with mud roof, and so on. The summary of these variables are in
Table 2.3. The results use only 2011 data and are divided into type of settlement according
to the 2011 census. The first two columns have admin rural areas. I however, did split the
admin rural areas into villages and census towns (CT). Admin urban areas are divided into
four categories, where NP stands for nagar panchayats, and are the smallest level of admin
urban areas. The "other" category is mostly made up with cantonment boards. One pattern
that stands out is the overwhelming number of admin rural areas. Administratively, India
is mostly consisted of rural settlements. Moreover, we see that villages are much smaller
in population and area compared to any other type of settlement. Census towns, while
technically admin rural, are much larger than villages that are both admin and de jure
rural. When looking at nagar panchayats, municipalities, and municipal corporations, the
size, in terms of both population and area look as expected with nagar panchayats being
the smallest and municipal corporations being the largest with municipalities in the middle.
On average, villages have higher fractions of scheduled cast and tribes compared to admin
urban areas. As one might expect, more people in villages work in agriculture or cultiva-
tion, both when looking at overall population or the male population. While municipalities
and municipal corporations have very low fraction of men working in agriculture (5.4% and
1.4% respectively), nagar panchayats clearly look less urbanized with 11.6% of their male
population employed in agriculture or cultivation. The final four variables give us a glimpse
of the economic status of the households in India. These variables suggest that villages are
on average worse off compared to admin urban areas. Interestingly, fraction of houses with
mud roofs and grass or mud walls are higher in nagar panchayats compared to census towns.
The outcome variables are measures of public goods allocation. This data also comes from
India’s census rounds 2001 and 2011 and includes variables such as fraction of households
with access to tap water, electricity, LPG/PNG gas, and drainage system within a village or
municipality. All the data is at the settlement level. The caveat with these variables is that
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we cannot be sure that the services are purely from the government. It is entirely possible
that citizens get their services privately. Potentially, wealthier citizens have more private
supplies of services such as, treated tap water. Given that, on average, cities are richer, this
biases the effect of having an urban government on public goods access upwards. Moreover,
the data does not speak to the quality of the public goods. Summary statistics of the
outcome variables used in the analyses are in Table 2.4, which only contains 2011. Again, I
breakdown the averages by settlement type. From Table 2.4, we see that overall, villages do
have the worst level of access to public goods compared to other types of settlements. An
exception is the number of elementary schools per 1,000 people. This is likely due to the
small population of villages. Villages also have higher fraction of households with untreated
tap water compared to municipal corporations, but this is because most households there
(around 67%) have access to treated tap water. From these two tables, we see that admin
rural areas are on average, smaller and poorer with worse public service access compared
to admin urban areas.
2.3.1.2. Urbanization
I use three different methods to identify urbanized areas using satellite and population data.
I identify urbanized areas in order to control for the degree of urbanization when comparing
admin urban and rural areas. The idea is that controlling for the level of urbanization,
socioeconomic variables, and fixed effects, the designation of admin urban can be as good
as random.
For the first method I use MODIS data as in Baragwanath Vogel et al. (2018). I use 2001
daytime satellite imagery to look at the builtup landcover constructed by Channan et al.
(2014). The MODIS data is categorical – that is each pixel is either urban or one of the
other categories such as, water, mixed forest, and so on. One of the categories is "urban and
built-up" and I consider areas covered by pixels of this classification to be "satellite urban."
However, the satellite data does not follow any administrative boundary. Instead, it consists
of pixels of the size of 500 meter by 500 meter. In order to determine settlements that are
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considered urban in the satellite data, I overlay the satellite image with the settlement-
level administrative boundary map of India. I classify a settlement as "satellite urban" if
maximum fraction of the area of a settlement is designated as "urban and built-up" by the
satellite data. The result of this classification is in Table ??’s first column. Alarmingly,
most of the settlements determined as "urban" by MODIS data is actually administratively
rural.
Using the same data, I also create a continuous variable of urbanization by calculating the
fraction of area classified as "urban and built-up" within a settlement.
For the third approach, I use Human Built-up And Settlement Extent (HBASE) data and
follow the method of Dingel et al. (2019). The preferred data is MODIS because 2001
data available. Given that I use 2011 outcome variables, using 2001 urbanization controls
help me avoid the "bad control" problem. HBASE data unfortunately starts from 2010.
However, unlike MODIS data, each pixel in the HBASE data has a continuous number
between 0-100 that measures the probability of being builtup. Again, HBASE is pixel data
with 500 meter by 500 meter dimension that does not follow administrative boundaries.
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the process I use to designate a settlement "satellite urban". The
first gridded image in Figure 2.1 represents the satellite image, where the number in each
square, called grid code, signifies the imperviousness level, i.e. the level of human builtup.
From this, I group together contiguous grids that are over a certain threshold (in this case,
the threshold is 50). I then overlay the satellite image with the administrative boundaries
(image on the top-right in this figure). Let’s call the administrative boundaries overlapping
with the contiguous polygon "candidate" boundaries. As it can be seen from the bottom
image, area B is completely within the contiguous polygon and hence is a "candidate".
Boundaries A and C overlap with both the grid code > 50 contiguous polygon and the
rest. Since the contiguous polygon does take up the most area for these two boundaries, we
include settlements A and C as candidates. Now we have contiguous settlements consisting
of areas A, B, and C. Finally, we add up all the contiguous candidates’ population and
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see if this exceeds 50,000. If so, I designate A, B, and C as satellite urban. The result of
following this process is in ??, second column. Again, we see that most of the identified
satellite urban areas are administratively rural. If we can trust the satellite data, this is
clear evidence of mismatch in government type as described in Section 2.2.3.
Now, I provide more information about the satellite urban areas that are identified using the
above described methods. Specifically, I investigate whether these satellite urban areas are
simply peripheries of admin urban areas or newly developed clusters removed from existing
admin urban areas. Table 2.1 shows the breakdown of satellite urban areas by dataset and
whether they neighbor admin urban areas. From both datasets, we see that about half of
the satellite urban areas are neighboring admin urban settlements. While there are many
satellite urban settlements that neighbor admin urban areas, it does appear that there is
unrecognized urbanization happening away from existing admin urban areas.
Table 2.1: Breakdown of Satellite Urban
MODIS HBASE
neighboring admin urban
No Yes Total No Yes Total
admin rural 1,178 1,378 2,556 1,498 1,472 2,970
admin urban 214 178 392 308 205 513
total 1,392 1,556 2,948 1,806 1,677 3,483
2.3.2. Identification
Again, the question at hand is whether local government structure matters for local goods
provision. In order to answer this question, I exploit the fact that India’s local urban and
rural governments have large structural differences. The following is the baseline estimating
equation:
Yit = β0 + β1admin_urbanit +Xit−10 + γ + εit (2.1)
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The outcome variable Yit is a measure for access to public goods, such as fraction of house-
holds with access to treated tap water in settlement i in year t. The main regressor of
interest is admin_urbanit. admin_urbanit = 1 if settlement i is administratively urban in
year t and 0 otherwise. A key limitation of the decadal census is that we do not know when
the transition to admin urban happened. Hence, admin_urbanit = 1 means that settle-
ment i became admin urban anytime before t. Since I do not know how long a settlement
has been admin urban, I am not able to measure the heterogeneity that might come from
shorter or longer exposure to being admin urban. On the other hand, the outcome variables
Yit and controls Xit−10 are more of a snapshot of the circumstances of the time period of
when the census survey was conducted. Xit−10 are lagged control variables – this includes
logged population, logged area, density, fraction SC/ST, fraction of workforce working in
agriculture, fraction literate, distance to district headquarters and an indicator variable for
being a cantonment board. It is important to control for these observables since, as we
saw from table 2.3, admin urban areas are larger, denser, and likely richer. Therefore, it
is reasonable to expect that there is better public service provision in admin urban areas
independent of the local government type. Finally, γ are district fixed effects, given that
policies and decisions are often made at the district level. Specification (2.1) identifies the
causal effect of admin_urbani if selection into admin_urbani is more or less random con-
ditional on observables Xit−10 and district level unobservables. While I do include a battery
of controls that account for urbanization I cannot capture all of it through observables. I
address this issue using satellite data that captures urbanization.
A complication in using more than one wave of the Indian census is the concordance across
years. India’s boundaries are continuously changing, and especially, when it comes to
transitioning from admin rural to urban, boundary changes are not uncommon. Hence,
it is important to take these boundary changes into account when using multiple census
years. I follow Perlman (2014) and unify the data to follow 2011 boundaries.
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2.3.3. Satellite data and fixed effects
One of the major concerns of simply using equation (2.1) is the effects of unobserved factors
that are related to urbanization and access to public goods within the district level. While
variables such as, population, density, and socioeconomic variables do explain urbanization,
they cannot fully account for urbanization. Therefore, I identify urbanized settlements di-
rectly by using methods and data delineated in section 2.3.1.2. I call areas identified as
urban (rural) via satellite data "satellite urban (rural)." I divide the sample using this em-
pirical distinction and estimate equation (2.1). The idea is that within a sample of satellite
urban or rural and controlling for additional observables and district fixed effects, the admin
urban designation is as good as random. Alternatively, using the continuous measure of
fraction satellite urban, I directly control for the level of urbanization by including a linear
"fraction urban" term in equation (2.1). A lingering issue with this identification strategy
is that there are still concerns of unobservables that are related to the admin urban status
public goods provision, such as political connections. Such unobservables can correlate with
both the admin_urbanit status and Yit. I will use a panel framework to address this issue.
2.3.4. Controls
It is worth going over the controls I use other than measures of urbanization through satellite
data given they play a central role in restoring randomness in admin urban designation.
The obvious ones are the population, density, and area controls. Since we see a positive
correlation between these factors and public goods access, it is important to control for
these to make sure our admin urban variable isn’t simply picking up the effects of larger
settlements. I also control for the fraction of scheduled caste (SC) and scheduled tribe
(ST). Fraction SC/ST can control for some socioeconomic differences across settlements.
They also, to an extent, reflect caste diversity within settlements, and social diversity is often
connected to public goods access and economic performance (Alesina and La Ferrara (2004),
Miguel and Gugerty (2005)). Fraction literate also controls socioeconomic differences. I do
not have country-wide income or expenditure data for India, so I use proxies like fraction
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literature instead. I also control for fraction of people working in agriculture or cultivation.
This should be able to further control for level of urbanization. I include all of these
variables’ quadratic forms as well. As per Asher et al. (2018) I include distance to district
headquarters. The authors find that villages more remote from their administration have
poorer access to public infrastructure and service such as roads, schools, health centers, and
irrigation. Finally, I include a variable for a settlement being a cantonment board as they
are notified under the Cantonments Act of 2006 which replaced the Cantonments Act of
1924.
2.4. Results
Here, I present the results of my empirical exercises. I first go over the results from using
satellite data and fixed effects then go over the panel results. I consistently find statistically
significant and positive effects of being admin urban on public goods access. For all analyses,
I drop settlements in the bottom five percentile of 2001 population. The reason being, these
settlements are so small that it is close to impossible to find admin urban areas that are
comparable, making the analyses potentially biased upwards, inflating the positive effects
of urban local governments.
2.4.1. Satellite control and fixed effects
First are the results from the satellite controls and fixed effects strategy. Due to data
limitations, the analyses only contain 2011 outcome variables. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show re-
sults from direct urbanization control with a fraction urbanization covariate measured from
the fraction of settlement area classified as urban from the MODIS data. Table 2.5 uses
the entire sample. Qualitatively, we see that being admin urban positively impacts public
goods provision. We also see that the being more "urban" according to the satellite data is
positively correlated to better provision of public goods. Table 2.6 excludes all settlements
with no satellite urban areas. The results are qualitatively the same as when using the
whole sample. We do see, however, that most of the settlements are not satellite urban
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areas. Tables A.2.1 and A.2.2 use HBASE data and tables 2.7 and 2.8, MODIS data urban
designation. The samples are further divided into satellite urban and rural. The results
across samples and datasets are consistent. Controlling for level of urbanization, there is
a qualitatively positive and statistically significant effect of being admin urban across all
outcome variables. The outcome variables, except for index, are the fraction of households
with access to the particular good.
The interpretation of column (1) of Table A.2.1 is as follows: within satellite urban sample
after controls and district level fixed effects, a settlement that is admin urban, on average,
has 14.7 percentage point greater provision of treated tap water across households. I created
the outcome variable "index" that is the average fraction of amenities a household has access
to within a settlement from amenities, (1) treated tap water (2) access to light (3) access
to light via electricity (4) waste water drainage and (5) LPG/PNG gas for kitchen. For
example if a household has LPG/PNG gas and treated tap water that house will have index
of 2/5. The index enables me to get a cohesive picture of the effect of being admin urban on
public goods access with significantly less noise compared to the other outcome variables. A
key aspect both Martinez (2018) and Gadenne (2017) look at is education. Yet, for admin
urban local governments, schools are actually not an obligatory responsibility, so I do not
include education variables here. I did, however, estiamte the effects of admin urban on
number of government primary schools, and the results were not consistently statistically
significant, as expected.
Now, I present graphical evidence. The graphs below use just the settlements with urban
area > 0. The figures to have level of urbanization on the x-axis. I created the "urban bins"
using a linear combination of fraction of area urban using MODIS data, population, and
density. For each bin, I estimate equation (2.1) separately. The coefficient on admin_urban
and 95% confidence intervals are reported in the graphs on the left side for each outcome
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variable. There are two main observations to be made here. One is that there does not
seem to be a systematic patten between magnitude of the coefficients and level of urban-
ization. The other is that across all level of urbanization the effects of being admin urban
are statistically significant and qualitatively significant. The right sides of the graphs are
the predicted outcomes for admin rural and admin urban separately. For the most part,
provision of public goods seem to improve with greater level of urbanization for both ad-
min urban and rural settlements. Admin urban and rural settlements actually look rather
parallel in their trends.
2.4.2. Placebo Test
There can be lingering concerns that the effects of admin urban we saw from section 2.4.1
is simply picking up the effects of admin urban areas being better off. If that were the
case, we should expect to see positive effects being admin urban on private services as well.
However, if I am successfully isolating the effects of governance structure, we should not
expect to see effects of being admin urban on private alternatives to public services. The
census provides numbers for private schools for both rural and urban settlements, so I repeat
the same empirical exercise as section 2.4.1. For the sample of admin rural areas, there is
a binary variable for whether there are private bus services. In addition, for the sample, of
census towns and admin urban areas, there is a variable for number of banks by settlement.
While these two variables do not cover the whole sample, I do include them in the analyses
and control for whether or not the settlement is satellite urban.
For both Tables ?? and ??, columns (1)-(4) use the satellite urban sample, while columns
(6)-(9) use satellite rural. All outcome variables except for "priv bus" signify the number of
private schools/banks per 1,000 people. We see that overall admin urban does not seem to
be have a systematic effect on private services. None of the coefficients, across sample and
data, are distinguishable from zero, as expected.
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2.5. Mechanism
From the empirical exercises, I show qualitatively positive and statistically significant ef-
fects of a settlement being admin urban, thereby demonstrating the importance of local
governmental structure on public goods provision. In this section, I explore the mechanism
through which this can be possible. I first discuss the mechanism of financial decentral-
ization. I measure financial decentralization using fraction of local own-source revenue as
opposed to transfers from the state and/or central government.
2.5.1. Financial Decentralization
A lot of the literature discussing the effects of variations in local governments’ revenue
on public goods provision find significant leakage and lack of variation in resources and
public goods outcomes. However, these papers (for example, Reinikka and Svensson (2004),
Reinikka and Svensson (2006), and Olken (2007)) focus mainly on revenue from transfers.
However, while there isn’t a large literature on it yet, when we focus on own-source revenue,
the results differ. Both Martinez (2018) and Gadenne (2017) find that increase in own-source
revenue, specifically tax-revenue leads to improvements in public services. In particular
Martinez (2018) finds that increases in tax-revenue leads to improvements in education,
health, and water quality while Gadenne (2017) finds improvements in both the quality and
quantity of education. Importantly Gadenne (2017) shows that improvement in capacity
of raising own-source revenue can have direct consequences on provision of public services.
In my context, I argue that the change from admin rural to admin urban status increases
the capacity to better raise own-source revenue, and the increased capacity manifests itself
through larger fraction of own-source revenue in admin urban areas.
2.5.1.1. Setting and Data
While the results so far have been for India as a whole, due to data limitations, I explore
West Bengal in particular. West Bengal published detailed local revenue and budgetary
data through its fourth state finance commission report. The data spans from 2007-2008 to
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2012-2013 and goes down to the local government level i.e. gram panchayat level for admin
rural areas and municipal level for admin urban areas. For both admin rural and urban
areas, variables for total revenue, transfers, non-tax revenue, tax revenue, and expenditures
on wages for public servants and civic services are available. Table 2.10 provides a per-
capita breakdown of these variables by admin rural, urban, and overall. The numbers are
in 100,000 rupees and averaged across the years. In general, we see that admin urban areas
have greater revenue across different sources of revenue. They spend less in per capita
on civic services. This latter result may be because admin urban areas are able to take
advantage of economies of scale. In dollars, the per-capita tax amounts to about $0.15
a year for admin rural areas and $149 a year for admin urban areas. When limiting the
sample to just satellite urban areas as defined with MODIS, the differences in revenue are
much smaller across admin rural and urban areas, but the same pattern persists.
For just the admin urban areas, data of the breakdown of transfers are available and are
presented in ??. About half of the transfers are for development programs such as, Jawa-
harlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), which is focused on capital
development. The main aspect to note here is the relatively low fraction of transfer that
is untied. Only about 15% of all transfers to admin urban areas are untied. This supports
my argument that fraction of own-source revenue reflects financial autonomy.
2.5.1.2. Relationship between admin rural/urban and fraction transfer
In order to test whether financial decentralization is a mechanism, I first have to show
the relationship between admin rural/urban status and degree of financial decentralization.
That is, we are interested in:
decentralizationit = α0 + α1admin_urbanit +Xit−10 + γ + εi (2.2)
With the budget data we can estimate the following:
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frac_ownsourcei = α0 + α1admin_urbanit + +Xit−10 + γ + εi (2.3)
Here, I am proxying level of decentralization using fraction of the local government’s revenue
that comes from own-source as opposed to central or state transfers. Again I control for
logged population, logged area, density, fraction SC/ST, fraction of workforce working in
agriculture, fraction literate and all of these variables’ quadratic forms, and distance to
district headquarters. Own-source revenue is the sum of tax and non-tax revenues. I
argue that fraction of own-source revenue is a good measure of financial decentralization as
local governments have more authority over how to spend own-source revenue compared to
transfers that are mostly tied to specific purposes. Moreover, it reflects local governments’
financial autonomy and capacity to collect their own revenue.
The results in Table ?? show results for equation (2.3). I exclude information for financial
year 2012-2013 since I only have admin urban information up until 2011. The first two
columns in the table show the main outcome variable of interest – fraction own-source rev-
enue. The fraction of own-source revenue is statistically significantly larger in admin urban
areas compared to admin rural areas in the satellite rural sample. Specifically, column (2)
shows us that within satellite rural areas, after controlling for socioeconomic variables and
district fixed effects, being admin urban is associated with approximately 11-12 percentage-
point higher own-source revenue compared to admin rural areas. Column (1), does show a
negative relationship between admin urban and fraction own-source revenue for the satel-
lite urban sample, but the standard errors are rather large. This result is interesting as
settlements that are both admin and satellite urban seem to be already collecting more own
source revenue with or without the presence of the urban government. This might suggest
that greater financial decentralization is not a channel for satellite urban areas. However,
there also could be increased financial independence that are not captured by fraction of
own-source revenue.
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The rest of the columns breaks down the own-source revenue. Columns (3)-(4) show the
relationship between admin urban and fraction of tax and (5)-(6) fraction of non-tax rev-
enue. Unexpectedly, fraction of taxes are actually lower in admin urban areas across both
samples. However, this result seems to be driven from the fact that admin urban areas
have a much larger fraction of non-tax revenue rather than from the small size of tax col-
lection compared to admin rural areas. Columns (5) and (6) show positive and statistically
significant relationship between being admin urban and fraction of non-tax revenue. While
column (5) shows a positive sign, again the standard errors are too large to conclude that
it is statistically different from zero. This satellite urban sample is lacking in sample size
for us to making meaningful conclusions. I plan to add more data from other states in the
future.
2.5.1.3. Fraction own-source revenue and outcomes
Now I turn to the direct relationship between fraction of own-source revenue and public
goods provision. I estimate the following equation:
Yit = α0 + α1frac_ownsourceit +Xit−10 + γ + ui (2.4)
Where Yi is an outcome variable for service provision. Given that the revenue data is
panel data within one census survey period, I collapse years 2007-8 to 2010-11 to create
frac_ownsource.
The results are in Tables 2.12 and 2.13. We see a (qualitatively) positive and statistically
significant relationship between fraction of own-source revenue and public service provision
across both satellite urban and rural samples independent of the satellite data source. All
standard errors are clustered at the sub-district level. This suggests a positive correlation
between financial decentralization and public service provision as a mechanism. Fraction
own-source revenue seems to affect satellite rural areas more than satellite urban areas.
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Consistent results are shown when using HBASE as well (Tables A.2.5) and refrfRuralH-
BASE)
2.6. Heterogeneous Effects
In this section, I explore heterogeneous effects of being admin urban. In particular, I
investigate whether being a neighbor to another admin urban area affects the impact of
being admin urban. This particular heterogeneity is of interest given that we saw from
Table 2.1 about half of all satellite urban areas neighbor admin urban areas. Moreover,
considering neighboring admin urban areas will help us understand spillover effects, if any.
In order to investigate this, I estiamte the following:
Yit = β0 + β1admin_urbanit + β2admin_urbanit × urban_nbrit+
Xit−10 · urban_nbrit + γ · urban_nbrit + εit (2.5)
Here, I include interaction terms with urbannbrit, which equals 1 if a settlement i neighbors
an admin urban area. The coefficient of interest is β2 – it gives us the effect of having an
admin urban neighbor given that i is admin urban. Tables 2.14 and A.2.7 show results for
the satellite urban samples. We see that given that an area is admin urban, compared to
admin areas that do not neighbor another admin area, admin areas neighboring another
admin area are less likely to have light through electricity and more likely to use kerosene
for light. The HBASE sample also shows that admin urban areas neighboring other admin
areas have less access to LPG/PNG gas. One exception to the general negative effects of
having a neighboring admin urban area is drainage. The satellite rural sample (Tables 2.15
and A.2.8) show the same pattern but with more variables showing statistically significant
and negative coefficients, including open drainage and index.
At first, this may be a puzzling result. However, it really shows that most likely, settlements
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neighboring admin urban areas already were benefiting from being in proximity to an admin
urban settlement through spillover effects. Consequently, when the settlement that already
was benefiting from spillover effects become admin urban itself, the positive effect is less
than a settlement that did not enjoy spillover effects.
Another piece of supporting evidence of this pattern comes from examining whether settle-
ments neighboring admin urban settlements are more or less likely to become admin urban.
Table 2.16 shows the results. These include the same controls and district fixed effects I’ve
been using for the main results. The main regressor is "adjacent to admin urban," which
equal 1 if a settlement neighbors and admin urban area. Columns (1)-(3) uses HBASE
data and (4)-(6) MODIS. We see that across all samples, if a settlement neighbors an ad-
min urban settlement, it is statistically less likely for that settlement to be admin urban.
This could be because settlements adjacent to admin urban areas are already enjoying the
spillover effects from their neighbors. From the constituents’ point of view, they are enjoy-
ing amenities of admin urban areas yet are not paying the fees and taxes of citizens living
in admin urban areas. Hence, constituents would likely not want their status to change,
which could be the reason behind the negative relationship between being adjacent to admin
urban areas and being admin urban. Moreover, this story is congruent with the hypothesis
that spillover effects explain the results from estimating equation (2.5).
2.7. Conclusion
The role of local government structure itself is often not discussed when in fact it can
effect economic development, public goods access, and policy implementation. This paper’s
contribution is to speak to the role of local government structure in public goods provision
in a developing country and explore the mechanism behind why government structure might
matter. Using India’s vastly different rural and urban government structures, I find that
local governance does matter for public goods provision and that India’s settlements with
urban local governments, on average, enjoy better access to public goods such as, treated tap
water, closed drainage, and light with electricity. These results hold with the inclusion of
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urbanization and socioeconomic controls and fixed effects. Evidence from local revenue data
suggests that these results can be explained by greater degree of financial decentralization in
urban admin areas. A main limitation of this paper comes from its inability to speak to the
quality of public services as I only have quantity data. Moreover, given that many aspects
of the rural and urban governments differ, India there may be other potential channels other
than the ones explored in this paper.
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2.8. Tables
Table 2.2: Breakdown of Satellite Urban
satellite urban
MODIS HBASE
admin rural 2,556 2,970
admin urban 392 513
total 2,948 3,483
This table shows the relationship between satellite urban and admin designation of rural and urban using
both MODIS and HBASE data.
Table 2.3: Characteristics of Settlements by Type
Type of Settlement
Village CT NP Munic M Corp Other Total
hh 282.19 3077.93 4652.91 13477.65 227155.12 5636.75 412.15
(417.61) (4207.82) (6842.41) (13829.00) (343604.06) (8331.29) (6736.34)
pop 1395.65 13949.18 23708.60 62519.49 1043621.56 27144.75 2000.18
(1961.49) (19182.75) (37915.41) (61256.37) (1531817.5) (38323.64) (30357.74)
area 4.282 6.584 11.69 21.47 93.49 14.03 4.395
(8.593) (6.878) (11.32) (24.46) (84.19) (24.52) (8.942)
density 653.45 3799.05 3754.06 4531.17 10997.61 3093.03 699.32
(1671.50) (6016.00) (5035.49) (6180.98) (7381.44) (4173.91) (1838.36)
frac SC .175 .155 .149 .139 .113 .125 .174
(.207) (.129) (.094) (.088) (.049) (.088) (.206)
frac ST .197 .045 .060 .037 .025 .030 .195
(.337) (.107) (.163) (.080) (.040) (.054) (.335)
frac employed .446 .357 .361 .345 .344 .420 .445
(.137) (.065) (.082) (.051) (.040) (.131) (.137)
frac male employed .539 .534 .523 .525 .526 .618 .539
(.098) (.065) (.066) (.054) (.051) (.110) (.098)
frac ag .225 .031 .084 .038 .009 .004 .223
(.158) (.030) (.085) (.044) (.008) (.005) (.158)
frac male ag .302 .046 .116 .054 .014 .005 .299
(.174) (.042) (.098) (.061) (.012) (.007) (.175)
frac dilapid. house .064 .047 .040 .033 .026 .023 .063
(.106) (.048) (.033) (.026) (.019) (.043) (.106)
frac mud roof .212 .054 .120 .062 .036 .031 .210
(.260) (.086) (.118) (.086) (.035) (.046) (.259)
frac grass wall .120 .056 .059 .034 .019 .007 .119
(.240) (.113) (.113) (.072) (.045) (.018) (.239)
frac mud wall .357 .134 .202 .137 .097 .079 .354
(.327) (.137) (.172) (.126) (.090) (.104) (.326)
N 597591 3895 2104 1702 157 95 605544
SD in parentheses
I present summary statistics for settlement characteristics and socioeconomic variables. I further divide the
sample into six categories. The first column contains settlements in villages. The second column uses just
census towns, which are "urban" according to the Indian census. The third column shows Nagar Panchayats,
which are the smallest admin urban settlements. The next two columns are municipalities and municipal
corporations, where municipalities are administratively smaller than the municipal corporations. The "other"
category is mostly made up with cantonment boards.
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Table 2.4: Public Goods Provision by Type
Type of Settlement
Village CT NP Munic M Corp Other Total
tap treated .150 .354 .401 .579 .669 .762 .154
(.289) (.300) (.282) (.279) (.250) (.290) (.291)
tap untreated .108 .107 .152 .134 .069 .101 .108
(.246) (.156) (.183) (.178) (.088) (.205) (.245)
light elec .503 .860 .787 .918 .946 .936 .508
(.375) (.172) (.208) (.085) (.062) (.138) (.375)
light kerosene .473 .128 .203 .070 .045 .054 .469
(.373) (.167) (.206) (.080) (.059) (.121) (.373)
light none .007 .004 .003 .004 .002 .003 .007
(.061) (.011) (.005) (.006) (.002) (.016) (.060)
closed drainage .044 .208 .172 .256 .470 .489 .047
(.118) (.203) (.145) (.205) (.250) (.314) (.121)
open drainage .273 .364 .525 .506 .378 .374 .276
(.330) (.236) (.241) (.225) (.214) (.297) (.329)
no drainage .681 .426 .302 .237 .150 .136 .676
(.355) (.268) (.243) (.179) (.129) (.230) (.356)
cooking fuel LPG/PNG .078 .442 .429 .582 .686 .732 .083
(.156) (.260) (.215) (.188) (.142) (.222) (.164)
elem (per ’000) 1.814 .326 .385 .338 .175 .473 1.795
(9.822) (.289) (.549) (.302) (.098) (1.325) (9.759)
N 597591 3895 2104 1702 157 95 605544
SD in parentheses
This table shows public goods provision according to the same categorization as Table 2.4. Except for the
last row that shows number of elementary schools per 1,000 people, the other variables show the average
chance of having each public good.
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Table 2.5: MODIS - Whole Sample with Urban Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tap treat light elec light kerosene closed drain open drain no drainage LPG/PNG index
admin urban 0.148∗∗ 0.028∗∗ -0.025∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.066∗∗ -0.143∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.098∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005)
frac urban 0.071∗∗ 0.110∗∗ -0.112∗∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.005 -0.104∗∗ 0.199∗∗ 0.097∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.006)
Observations 512013 512013 512013 512013 512013 512013 512013 511667
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist dist dist dist dist dist dist dist
sample all all all all all all all all
ctrl mean .1478 .5157 .4660 .0440 .2805 .6754 .0824 .4130
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at dist level
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.6: MODIS - Sample: Some Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tap treat light elec light kerosene closed drain open drain no drainage LPG/PNG index
admin urban 0.155∗∗ 0.042∗∗ -0.041∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.082∗∗ -0.137∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.094∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005)
frac urban 0.027∗∗ 0.050∗∗ -0.047∗∗ 0.050∗∗ -0.025∗ -0.024+ 0.090∗∗ 0.038∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.006)
Observations 28417 28417 28417 28417 28417 28417 28417 28399
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist dist dist dist dist dist dist dist
sample urban>0 urban>0 urban>0 urban>0 urban>0 urban>0 urban>0 urban>0
ctrl mean .2415 .6711 .3135 .0899 .4007 .5093 .1933 .5181
Standard errors in parentheses
Std errors clustered at dist level
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show results from direct urbanization control with a fraction urbanization covariate
measured from the fraction of settlement area classified as urban from the MODIS data. Table 2.5 uses
the entire sample. The outcome variables are binary variables except for the eighth column with "index."
Index is the average fraction of amenities a household has access to within a settlement from amenities,
(1) treated tap water (2) access to light (3) access to light via electricity (4) waste water drainage and (5)
LPG/PNG gas for kitchen.
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Table 2.7: MODIS - Sample: Satellite Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tap treat light elec light kerosene closed drain open drain no drainage LPG/PNG index
admin urban 0.171∗∗ 0.024 -0.023 0.089∗∗ 0.051+ -0.141∗∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.090∗∗
(0.036) (0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.031) (0.028) (0.024) (0.016)
Observations 2465 2465 2465 2465 2465 2465 2465 2462
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist dist dist dist dist dist dist dist
sample S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban
ctrl mean .2359 .6708 .3175 .1493 .4233 .4273 .3108 .5570
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at dist level
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.8: MODIS - Sample: Satellite Rural
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tap treat light elec light kerosene closed drain open drain no drainage LPG/PNG index
admin urban 0.153∗∗ 0.046∗∗ -0.044∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.075∗∗ -0.155∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.109∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
Observations 509548 509548 509548 509548 509548 509548 509548 509205
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist dist dist dist dist dist dist dist
sample S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural
ctrl mean .1474 .5150 .4666 .0435 .2799 .6765 .0815 .4124
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at dist level
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show sub-sample analyses where 2.7 and 2.8 only contain satellite urban and rural
settlements respectively. The satellite urban/rural designation was made through the MODIS data. The
outcome variables are binary variables except for the eighth column with "index." Index is the average
fraction of amenities a household has access to within a settlement from amenities, (1) treated tap water (2)
access to light (3) access to light via electricity (4) waste water drainage and (5) LPG/PNG gas for kitchen.
Table 2.9: MODIS - Private Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
priv elem priv MS priv secondary priv sr second priv bank priv elem priv MS priv secondary priv sr second
admin urban -0.270 -0.650 -0.150 -0.087 0.016 -0.032 -0.056 -0.090 0.002
(0.285) (0.499) (0.116) (0.091) (0.010) (0.058) (0.054) (0.059) (0.017)
S urban -0.011
(0.010)
Observations 2465 2387 2467 2469 6054 508151 507375 509523 509581
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist dist dist dist dist dist dist dist dist
sample S urban S urban S urban S urban CT +ad urban S rural S rural S rural S rural
ctrl mean .4093 .3545 .1157 .0586 .0441 .1721 .1010 .0590 .0257
Standard errors in parentheses
Std errors clustered at dist level
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
This table tests for placebo effects using private services. I include private schooling. The first four columns
are limited to satellite urban using MODIS data. Column (5) is a binary variable indicating whether
settlement has private banking. This variable was only available for the sample of census towns and admin-
istratively urban settlements. The last four columns looking at private schooling in MODIS satellite rural
settlements.
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Table 2.10: West Bengal Per-Capita Revenue Breakdown (Rs. in 100,000)





Total Revenue 0.117 2.302 0.0203 2.321 0.191
(0.896) (3.534) (0.257) (5.304) (0.895)
Transfers from State/Central Govt 0.0870 1.613 0.0194 1.936 0.183
(0.760) (3.129) (0.250) (5.326) (0.872)
Tax Revenue 0.00476 0.102 0.000440 0.134 0.00420
(0.0434) (0.183) (0.00670) (0.187) (0.0230)
Non-Tax Revenue 0.0252 0.586 0.000401 0.251 0.00396
(0.359) (1.647) (0.00495) (0.391) (0.0176)
Civic Services 0.0219 0.00165 0.0229 0.00129 0.213
(0.234) (0.00246) (0.239) (0.00178) (0.840)
This table shows the per-capita revenue breakdown of West Bengal. All numbers are in 100,0000 Rs. The
first column uses whole sample, and the next two show results for admin urban and rural areas separately.
The last two columns are limited to satellite urban areas and are again broken down in admin urban and
rural. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 2.11: West Bengal: Admin Urban and Own Source Revwnuw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
frac own frac own frac tax frac tax frac nontax frac nontax
admin urban 0.019 0.115∗∗ -0.028 -0.019+ 0.048 0.134∗∗
(0.049) (0.023) (0.023) (0.011) (0.046) (0.021)
Observations 963 48484 963 48484 963 48484
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist, yr dist, yr dist, yr dist, yr dist, yr dist, yr
sample S urban S rural S urban S rural S urban S rural
cluster subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
The table shows results for equation (2.3). The sample only contains West Bengal. I exclude information for
financial year 2012-2013 since I only have admin urban information up until 2011. The first two columns in
the table show the main outcome variable of interest – fraction own-source revenue. Columns (3)-(4) show
the relationship between admin urban and fraction of tax and (5)-(6) fraction of non-tax revenue.
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Table 2.12: West Bengal Own Source Revenue: Satellite Urban (MODIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tap treat light elec light kerosene closed drain open drain no drainage LPG/PNG index
frac own 0.008 0.080+ -0.077+ -0.040 0.121+ -0.081 0.167∗∗ 0.067∗
(0.099) (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.064) (0.073) (0.057) (0.029)
Observations 963 963 963 963 963 963 963 963
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist dist dist dist dist dist dist dist
sample S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban
cluster subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.13: West Bengal Own Source Revenue: Satellite Rural (MODIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tap treat light elec light kerosene closed drain open drain no drainage LPG/PNG index
frac own 0.164∗∗ 0.171∗∗ -0.160∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.062∗ -0.092∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.114∗∗
(0.048) (0.037) (0.035) (0.009) (0.027) (0.033) (0.033) (0.022)
Observations 48436 48436 48436 48436 48436 48436 48436 48436
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist dist dist dist dist dist dist dist
sample S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban
cluster subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Tables 2.12 and 2.13 show sub-sample analyses limited to West Bengal. Unlike Tables 2.7 and 2.8, we look
at the relationship between fraction own-source revenue and public goods access. The satellite urban/rural
designation was made through the MODIS data. The outcome variables are binary variables except for the
eighth column with "index." Index is the average fraction of amenities a household has access to within a
settlement from amenities, (1) treated tap water (2) access to light (3) access to light via electricity (4)
waste water drainage and (5) LPG/PNG gas for kitchen.
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Table 2.14: Spillover Effects: Satellite Urban (MODIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tap treat light elec light kerosene closed drain open drain no drainage LPG/PNG index
admin urban 0.173∗∗ 0.125∗∗ -0.126∗∗ 0.046 0.019 -0.065 0.215∗∗ 0.115∗∗
(0.056) (0.040) (0.040) (0.060) (0.070) (0.046) (0.052) (0.024)
admin urban X urban nbr 0.003 -0.130∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.077 0.022 -0.099 -0.127+ -0.030
(0.091) (0.047) (0.048) (0.072) (0.085) (0.062) (0.065) (0.037)
Observations 2462 2462 2462 2462 2462 2462 2462 2459
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr
sample S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban
Standard errors in parentheses
Std errors clustered at dist level
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.15: Spillover Effects:: Satellite rural (MODIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tap treat light elec light kerosene closed drain open drain no drainage LPG/PNG index
admin urban 0.162∗∗ 0.059∗∗ -0.060∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.078∗∗ -0.159∗∗ 0.217∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005)
admin urban X urban nbr -0.040+ -0.063∗∗ 0.068∗∗ -0.002 -0.014 0.016 -0.133∗∗ -0.051∗∗
(0.023) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.013)
Observations 505807 505807 505807 505807 505807 505807 505807 505479
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr
sample S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural
Standard errors in parentheses
Std errors clustered at dist level
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Tables 2.14 and 2.15 show results for MODIS satellite urban and rural samples. The interaction term is
binary variable of being admin urban interacted with another binary variable, which equals 1 when the
settlement neighbors an admin urban settlement.
Table 2.16: Chances of Being Admin Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
admin urban admin urban admin urban admin urban admin urban admin urban
adjacent to admin urban -0.020∗∗ -0.099∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.090∗∗ -0.018∗∗
(0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001)
Observations 516771 3274 513497 516771 2552 514219
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist
sample all S urban S rural all S urban S rural
cluster dist dist dist dist dist dist
data hbase hbase hbase modis modis modis
Standard errors in parentheses
Std errors clustered at dist level
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
The above shows the effect of having an admin urban settlement as a neighbor on chances of being admin
urban itself. These include the same controls and district fixed effects I’ve been using for the main results.
The main regressor is "adjacent to admin urban," which equal 1 if a settlement neighbors and admin urban
area. Columns (1)-(3) uses HBASE data and (4)-(6) MODIS.
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2.9. Figures
Figure 2.1: Satellite Urban Designation
This figure illustrates the process I use to designate a settlement "satellite urban". The first gridded image
in Figure 2.1 represents the satellite image, where the number in each square, called grid code, signifies the
imperviousness level, i.e. the level of human builtup. From this, I group together contiguous grids that
are over a certain threshold (in this case, the threshold is 50). I then overlay the satellite image with the
administrative boundaries (image on the top-right in this figure). Let’s call the administrative boundaries
overlapping with the contiguous polygon "candidate" boundaries. As it can be seen from the bottom image,
area B is completely within the contiguous polygon and hence is a "candidate". Boundaries A and C overlap
with both the grid code > 50 contiguous polygon and the rest. Since the contiguous polygon does take
up the most area for these two boundaries, we include settlements A and C as candidates. Now we have
contiguous settlements consisting of areas A, B, and C. Finally, we add up all the contiguous candidates’
population and see if this exceeds 50,000. If so, I designate A, B, and C as satellite urban.
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Figure 2.2: Jhalda, West Bengal –
admin urban
Figure 2.3: Panchpara, West Bengal – admin
rural
These images are taken from Google satellite maps. Figure 2.2 is a satellite image of Jhalda in West Bengal.
Jhalda is a municipality, or admin urban, with an urban local government. In Figure 2.3 we have Panchpar,




Figure A.1.1: Rajasthan Borders
This figure shows the state of Rajasthan in India. The red thicker borders show the assembly boundaries
and the gray thinner borders are gram panchayat boundaries.
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This table describes the number of households and population within sample gram panchayats. I report the
average, 1st percentile, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile and 99th percentile.
Table A.1.2: Triple-Difference Effects on Households Worked
Households Worked
(1) (2) (3)
tot HH SC non-SC
Inter SC × Local SC × post 2.63∗∗ 1.06∗ 1.56
(1.29) (0.59) (0.99)
Local SC × post -3.32∗∗∗ 0.25 -3.57∗∗∗
(0.80) (0.23) (0.68)
Inter SC × post -2.21 0.24 -2.45∗
(1.80) (0.74) (1.32)
Observations 588096 588096 588096
R2 0.477 0.400 0.486
outcome mean 25.21 7.10 18.12
state-time FE X X X
GP FE X X X
unique GP 6126 6126 6126
Standard errors clustered at assembly level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The outcome variables reflect the number of households worked in a given gram panchayat monthly. The
first column shows results for total monthly households that worked NREGS jobs, and columns (2) and (3)
are broken down into SC households and non-SC households respectively. The first row of coefficients show
the triple-difference effects. All estimates include state-time fixed effects and gram panchayat fixed effects.
I report outcome variable means and number of unique gram panchayats as well. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Table A.1.3: Winsorized Results
Days
(1) (2) (3)
tot days SC non-SC
Inter SC × Local SC × post 28.79∗ 12.25∗∗ 13.95
(16.08) (6.037) (13.33)
Local SC × post -46.04∗∗∗ 3.994 -51.31∗∗∗
(10.97) (2.918) (9.060)
Inter SC × post -16.02 5.630 -22.21
(27.80) (9.087) (22.07)
Observations 588,096 588,096 588,096
R2 0.471 0.384 0.481
outcome mean 322.241 89.285 230.588
state-time FE X X X
GP FE X X X
unique GP 6,126 6,126 6,126
Standard errors clustered at assembly level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The outcome variables winsorized at the 99 percent level and reflect the summation of number of days
worked in a given gram panchayat monthly, but winsorized. Note that this is not equivalent to per-household
work-days. The first column shows results for all monthly NREGS work-days, and column (2) and (3) are
broken down into days worked by only SC households and non-SC households respectively. The first row
of coefficients show the triple-difference effects. All estimates include state-time fixed effects and gram
panchayat fixed effects. I report outcome variable means and number of unique gram panchayats as well.
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Table A.1.4: Results with Interacted Controls
Days
(1) (2) (3)
tot days SC non-SC
Inter SC × Local SC × post 37.03∗ 16.59∗ 20.45
(21.32) (8.697) (17.48)
Local SC × post -53.24∗∗∗ -5.145 -48.10∗∗∗
(13.95) (4.042) (11.69)
Inter SC × post -22.45 2.883 -25.33
(30.86) (10.81) (24.30)
Observations 540,000 540,000 540,000
R2 0.442 0.376 0.445
outcome mean 384.084 102.647 281.438
state-time FE X X X
GP FE X X X
controls × post X X X
unique GP 5,625 5,625 5,625
Standard errors clustered at assembly level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The outcome variables are the summation of number of days worked in a given gram panchayat monthly.
Note that this is not equivalent to per-household work-days. The first column shows results for all monthly
NREGS workdays. Columns 2 and 3 are broken down into days worked by only SC households and non-
SC households, respectively. The first row of coefficients show the triple-difference effects. All estimates
include state-time fixed effects and gram panchayat fixed effects. These results also include controls for total
number of households, number of SC households, and area interacted with the "post" indicator variable.
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The graphs use just the settlements with urban area > 0. The figures have level of urbanization on the x-axis.
I created "urban bins" using a linear combination of fraction of area urban using MODIS data, population,
and density. For each bin, I estimate equation (2.1) separately. The coefficient on admin_urban and 95%
confidence intervals are reported in the graphs on the left side. The graphs on the right hand side are the
predicted outcomes for admin rural and admin urban separately.
Table A.2.1: HBASE - Sample: Satellite Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tap treat light elec light kerosene closed drain open drain no drainage LPG/PNG index
admin urban 0.147∗∗ 0.026∗ -0.028∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.039+ -0.120∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.081∗∗
(0.030) (0.012) (0.011) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012)
Observations 3199 3199 3199 3199 3199 3199 3199 3195
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist dist dist dist dist dist dist dist
sample S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban
ctrl mean .3183 .8315 .1563 .1875 .4915 .3208 .4239 .6497
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at dist level
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.2.2: HBASE - Sample: Satellite Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tap treat light elec light kerosene closed drain open drain no drainage LPG/PNG index
admin urban 0.158∗∗ 0.048∗∗ -0.046∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.081∗∗ -0.160∗∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.112∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Observations 493358 493358 493358 493358 493358 493358 493358 493039
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist dist dist dist dist dist dist dist
sample S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural
ctrl mean .1483 .5181 .4642 .0438 .2815 .6745 .0816 .4136
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at dist level
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
A.2.1 and A.2.2 show sub-sample analyses where A.2.1 and A.2.2 only contain satellite urban and rural
settlements respectively. The satellite urban/rural designation was made through the HBASE data. The
outcome variables are binary variables except for the eighth column with "index." Index is the average
fraction of amenities a household has access to within a settlement from amenities, (1) treated tap water (2)
access to light (3) access to light via electricity (4) waste water drainage and (5) LPG/PNG gas for kitchen.
Table A.2.3: HBASE - Private Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
priv elem priv MS priv secondary priv sr second priv bank priv elem priv MS priv secondary priv sr second
admin urban -0.152 -0.219 -0.049 -0.051 0.016 -0.027 -0.060 -0.087 0.003
(0.228) (0.232) (0.059) (0.054) (0.011) (0.056) (0.053) (0.058) (0.017)
S urban -0.001
(0.004)
Observations 3203 3149 3204 3205 6054 507413 506613 508786 508845
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist dist dist dist dist dist dist dist dist
sample S urban S urban S urban S urban CT +ad urban S rural S rural S rural S rural
ctrl mean .2962 .2052 .1183 .0597 .0441 .1724 .1014 .0589 .0256
Standard errors in parentheses
Std errors clustered at dist level
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
This table tests for placebo effects using private services. I include private schooling. The first four columns
are limited to satellite urban using HBASE data. Column (5) is a binary variable indicating whether
settlement has private banking. This variable was only available for the sample of census towns and admin-
istratively urban settlements. The last four columns looking at private schooling in HBASE satellite rural
settlements.
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Table A.2.4: Admin Urban Transfer Breakdown
Admin Urban Transfer Breakdown
frac salary/pension frac untied frac fixed frac dev frac other
admin urban .198 .147 .069 .504 .079
(.115) (.058) (.032) (.135) (.065)
N 126 126 126 126 126
SD in parentheses
This the breakdown of the transfers to admin urbna areas. Frac dev are fraction transfered for development
project.
Table A.2.5: West Bengal Own Source Revenue: Satellite Urban (HBASE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tap treat light elec light kerosene closed drain open drain no drainage LPG/PNG index
frac own -0.153 0.194∗∗ -0.185∗∗ 0.154 0.124 -0.277∗ 0.489∗∗ 0.163∗∗
(0.190) (0.053) (0.049) (0.152) (0.134) (0.100) (0.091) (0.052)
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist dist dist dist dist dist dist dist
sample S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban
cluster subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.2.6: West Bengal Own Source Revenue: Satellite Rural (HBASE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tap treat light elec light kerosene closed drain open drain no drainage LPG/PNG index
frac own 0.263∗∗ 0.229∗∗ -0.220∗∗ 0.035∗ 0.084+ -0.119∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.163∗∗
(0.073) (0.060) (0.059) (0.014) (0.044) (0.053) (0.054) (0.036)
Observations 9682 9682 9682 9682 9682 9682 9682 9682
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist dist dist dist dist dist dist dist
sample S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural
cluster subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist subdist
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Tables A.2.5 and A.2.6 show sub-sample analyses limited to West Bengal. Unlike Tables A.2.1 and A.2.2,
we look at the relationship between fraction own-source revenue and public goods access. The satellite
urban/rural designation was made through the MODIS data. The outcome variables are binary variables
except for the eighth column with "index." Index is the average fraction of amenities a household has
access to within a settlement from amenities, (1) treated tap water (2) access to light (3) access to light via
electricity (4) waste water drainage and (5) LPG/PNG gas for kitchen.
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Table A.2.7: Spillover Effects: Satellite Urban (HBASE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tap treat light elec light kerosene closed drain open drain no drainage LPG/PNG index
admin urban 0.137∗∗ 0.073∗∗ -0.076∗∗ 0.093∗ -0.011 -0.081∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.089∗∗
(0.050) (0.024) (0.023) (0.038) (0.037) (0.028) (0.030) (0.019)
admin urban X urban nbr 0.005 -0.087∗∗ 0.089∗∗ -0.029 0.049 -0.020 -0.113∗∗ -0.031
(0.068) (0.027) (0.027) (0.045) (0.047) (0.038) (0.040) (0.026)
Observations 3199 3199 3199 3199 3199 3199 3199 3195
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr
sample S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban S urban
Standard errors in parentheses
Std errors clustered at dist level
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.2.8: Spillover Effects: Satellite Rural (HBASE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tap treat light elec light kerosene closed drain open drain no drainage LPG/PNG index
admin urban 0.165∗∗ 0.065∗∗ -0.065∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.085∗∗ -0.165∗∗ 0.222∗∗ 0.123∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
admin urban X urban nbr -0.028 -0.059∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.011 -0.011 0.000 -0.126∗∗ -0.043∗∗
(0.024) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.024) (0.019) (0.014)
Observations 505977 505977 505977 505977 505977 505977 505977 505640
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr dist X nbr
sample S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural S rural
Standard errors in parentheses
Std errors clustered at dist level
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Tables 2.14 and 2.15 show results for MODIS satellite urban and rural samples. The interaction term is
binary variable of being admin urban interacted with another binary variable, which equals 1 when the
settlement neighbors an admin urban settlement.
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